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ABSTRACT 
 
U.S. Cross-listing, Institutional Investors, and Equity Returns 
 
By 
 
LAW Yui 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Cross-listing refers to firms listing their equities on more than one stock exchange. 
Cross-listing is an interesting topic of international finance. This is because along 
with the deeper integration of the global financial market, we should see lesser 
importance of geographic factors. Thus, the motivations and effects of listing a firm 
on exchanges of different regions should have essential economic implications. The 
reputation bonding hypothesis suggests that U.S. cross-listing improves the 
information environment of a firm because of the higher disclosure standard and more 
analyst coverage. The legal bonding hypothesis argues that U.S. cross-listing 
improves the investor protection and corporate governance of a firm since the firm is 
under more stringent law and regulation. The firm growth hypothesis points out that 
U.S. cross-listing lowers the external capital cost of a firm and thus enables the firm to 
achieve a higher growth rate. 
Using a sample with 12532 firms of 23 developed regions from 2006 to 2011, this 
thesis tests the three hypotheses of cross-listing. Firstly, my empirical results show 
that a cross-listing on the U.S. exchanges improves the equity returns predictability of 
institutional investors. I find a stronger positive correlation between the changes in 
institution ownership level and future equity returns of U.S. cross-listed firms. This 
suggests that the information environment is improved after a U.S. cross-listing. 
However, the improvement in information environment exists only in non-crisis 
period. Secondly, the results support the firm growth hypothesis. The U.S. 
cross-listing event only has a positive effect on equity returns of firms with younger 
age and lower dividend yield. This effect becomes less obvious during the crisis 
period. Thirdly, the legal bonding effect of U.S. cross-listing only exists during the 
crisis period, when the financial market is volatile. During the crisis period, a U.S. 
cross-listing increases the equity returns of the firms form non-common-law regions, 
but not the firms from common-law regions.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Listing a firm on a foreign exchange is not a new phenomenon. According to the 
World Federation of Exchanges, in 1995, there was 246 and 361 foreign firms listed 
their equities on NYSE and NASDAQ respectively. In 2010, the numbers remained 
stable, with 451 on NYSE and 298 on the NASDAQ. Along with the increasing 
liberalization of the international financial market, the equity markets around the 
world should be more integrated. However, we are still seeing a large number of 
firms trading on foreign equity markets. Therefore, we should find out the 
motivations and impacts of the cross-listing decisions of the firms.  
Despite of the long history of overseas listing, academic researches still do not have 
a concrete conclusion about what are the reasons driving a firm listing on a foreign 
exchange. Academic researches on foreign listing can be divided into three main 
groups. One focuses on the legal bonding hypothesis (e.g. Reese and Weisbach, 
2002; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004; Doidge, 2004; Lel and Miller, 2008; Frésard 
and Salva, 2010), another focuses on the reputation bonding hypothesis or the 
information improvement hypothesis (e.g. Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver, 2002; Lang, 
Lins and Miller, 2003; Siegel, 2005; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008), and the third 
one focuses on the firm growth hypothesis (e.g. Röell and Zechner, 2002; Khurana, 
Martin and Periera, 2008; Hail and Leuz, 2009).  
The legal bonding hypothesis argues that different exchanges are characterized by 
different standards of law and regulation, and thus have different levels of investor 
protection. Firms from a region with low standards of law and regulation can list 
their equities on exchanges with stringent legal and regulatory standards. Thus, the 
firms can enhance the level of investor protection and reduce the cost of capital 
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(Coffee, 1999; Coffee, 2001). The reputation bonding hypothesis or information 
improvement hypothesis does not agree with the importance and effectiveness of the 
legal bonding, this is because some studies (e.g. Seigel, 2005) show that the legal 
enforcement of the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) on foreign listing firms is 
weak. The reputation bonding hypothesis suggests that the better quality of 
corporate governance is caused by the improvement in the information environment 
of the cross-listed firms. The possible factors of the improvement are the higher 
disclosure standard and more analyst coverage.  
Besides these two main hypotheses, some studies suggest that the lack of external 
capital by growing firms is an important reason for cross-listing. For example, 
Pagano, Röell and Zechner (2002) show that firms cross-listed on the U.S. 
exchanges tend to be rapidly expanding high-tech and export-oriented companies 
with low leverage. Khurana, Martin and Periera (2008) find out that the 
external-financed growth rate of firms increases significantly after a U.S. 
cross-listing. Furthermore, Hail and Leuz (2009) point out that about half of the 
increase in equity value of the firms after a U.S. cross-listing is caused by the 
change in growth expectation.  
In this thesis, the goals are to test the information environment improvement 
hypothesis, the legal bonding hypothesis and the firm growth hypothesis of 
cross-listing. In other words, this thesis tests whether a U.S. cross-listing improves 
the information environment, the corporate governance and the growth opportunity 
of the firms. 
For the information environment improvement hypothesis, I suggest that the equity 
returns predictability of institutional investors is positively related to the information 
3 
 
environment. If cross-listing on the U.S. exchanges can improve the information 
environment, the equity returns predictability of institutional investors on the U.S. 
cross-listed firm should be improved. The definition of equity returns predictability 
of institutional investors of this thesis follows the definition of Gompers and Metrick 
(2001), i.e. the positive partial correlation between the changes in ownership of 
institutional investors in the period t-1 and the equity returns in period t. Therefore, I 
expect that the changes in institutional ownership level have a stronger positive 
correlation with future equity returns of firms with a U.S. cross-listing than those 
without. 
For the legal bonding hypothesis, the sample is divided into firms from common-law 
regions and non-common-law regions. If the U.S. cross-listing enhances the legal 
and regulatory standards and the difference in the legal standard between the United 
States and the non-common-law regions is larger, the equity returns should have a 
greater increase during and after the cross-listing period for firms from 
non-common-law regions, indicating the greater decrease in the cost of capital and 
improvement in performance of the U.S. cross-listed firms from these regions.  
For the firm growth hypothesis, the sample is divided into firms with sample period 
mean age higher and lower than the sample period median and firms with sample 
period mean dividend yield higher and lower than the sample period median. If a 
U.S. cross-listing can reduce the financial constraints of the growing firms, a U.S. 
cross-listing should have a greater positive effect on the equity returns of firms with 
younger age and lower dividend yield. These two characteristics reflect the weaker 
financial situation. 
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This thesis uses the semi-annual data of 12532 firms of 23 developed regions from 
the first half of 2006 to the first half of 2011. First, my regression analyses support 
the information environment improvement hypothesis. My results show that a U.S. 
cross-listing significantly increases the positive correlation between the changes in 
institutional ownership level and the future equity returns, reflecting a higher equity 
predictability of institutional investors on U.S. cross-listed firms. Therefore, the 
information environment is improved after a U.S. cross-listing. Moreover, the 
increase in equity returns predictability is higher for U.S. cross-listed firms from 
non-common-law regions, indicating the larger difference in information 
environment between the United-States and the non-common-law regions. However, 
the information environment improvement effect of U.S. cross-listing does not exist 
in the crisis period, i.e. from the second half of 2008 to the second half of 2009. 
Second, my results support the firm growth hypothesis. After a cross-listing on the 
U.S. exchanges, firms with younger age and lower dividend yield experience an 
increase in equity returns. The thesis suggests the reason is that the U.S. cross-listing 
improves the financial condition of the younger firms and firms lacking for external 
capital. 
Thirdly, my results show that although the legal bonding effect of the U.S. 
cross-listing does not exist during the whole sample period and the non-crisis period, 
it exists during the crisis period, i.e. from the second half of 2008 to the second of 
2009. From the first half of 2006 to the first half of 2011, U.S. cross-listing only had 
a positive effect on the equity returns of firms from common-law regions, but from 
the second half of 2008 to the second half of 2009, U.S. cross-listing only had a 
positive effect on the equity returns of firms from non-common-law regions.  
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This thesis makes several contributions. First, it tests directly whether U.S. 
cross-listing can effectively enhance the information environment of the firms by 
analyzing the difference between the equity returns predictability of institutional 
investors on U.S. cross-listed firms and non-U.S.-cross-listed firms. Previous studies 
only test the information environment improvement indirectly by analyzing whether 
U.S. cross-listing increases the variation of accounting earnings or the proportion of 
variation of firm specific equity returns (e.g. Lang, Raedy and Yetman(2003); 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008)).  
Second, for the legal bonding hypothesis and firm growth hypothesis, this thesis 
uses the most recent data from 2006 to 2011, while the sample period of most 
previous researches are before 2005. Also, most, if not all, of the previous researches 
do not control the demand preference of the institutional investors. If cross-listing 
affects the demand preference of institutional investors, and the demand preference 
affects the equity returns, the estimation of the effect of cross-listing may not be 
consistent. This thesis controls both the firm specific factors affecting the 
cross-listing decision and the demand preference of institutional investors in order to 
estimate the effect of U.S. cross-listing more accurately.  
Third, the additional regression analyses of this thesis test the three hypotheses of 
cross-listing by splitting the sample period into the non-crisis period and the crisis 
period in order to analyze whether the three effects of U.S. cross-listing exist in both 
the non- crisis and the crisis period. 
Fourth, this thesis find out that cross-listing on London Stock Exchange (LSE) and 
exchanges other than the U.S. exchanges and LSE benefit firms with characteristics 
different from those benefited from a U.S. cross-listing. Although the information 
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environment improvement effect does not exist for firms cross-listed on London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) or exchanges other than the U.S. exchanges and LSE, 
cross-listing on LSE benefits firms with higher age and higher dividend yield, and 
cross-listing on exchanges other than the U.S. exchanges and LSE benefit firms with 
both lower and higher age and firms with lower dividend yield.  
The remaining chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literatures of 
cross-listing and equity returns predictability of institutional investors. Chapter 3 
develops the hypotheses and describes the regression model and variable data. 
Chapter 4 presents the empirical analyses. Chapter 5 concludes.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
In the previous chapter, the main theme of the thesis is introduced. This chapter 
reviews the three hypotheses of cross-listing, i.e. the legal bonding hypothesis, the 
information improvement hypothesis, and the firm growth hypothesis. Moreover, the 
studies of equity returns predictability of institutional investors are also described. 
2.1 Survey on the cross-listed firms 
At the beginning of the cross-listing literature review, two surveys are introduced. 
The surveys spend little on economic theory development and may not give deep 
insight about the motivations and effects of cross-listing. However, because they 
directly ask the chief financial officers or executives in charges of shareholder 
relations of the firms with questions about the reasons for an overseas listing and the 
difficulties faced by the overseas listing firms, they may serve as a supplement of the 
accounting and financial data empirical researches.  
The first survey is Fanto and Karmel (1997). According to the survey, there is no 
dominant reason for a U.S. listing. 23% of the respondents agree that the reasons are 
for business motivations, such as U.S. acquisition or U.S. business expansion. 23% 
mention that the reasons are the benefits of U.S. capital market, such as better price, 
liquidity and status. 23% point out that the reasons are industry motivations, such as 
listing of competitors and benefits of analysts. Only 11% agree that the reason is to 
expand the U.S. shareholder base. For the difficulties of a U.S. listing, results are 
more determinant. More than 50% of the respondents think that the main difficulties 
are disclosure and accounting reconciliation. Only around 30% agree that the 
monetary expense is the obstacle. Another survey about foreign listing is Bancel and 
Mittoo (2001). This study shows that among 9 options, on average, respondents rank 
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the disclosure of more information as the first important consequence of 
cross-listing, while the consequence of enhancing the internal procedures of 
management control is in the sixth rank. 
The limitation of these surveys is lack of economic theories to analyze the 
motivations of cross-listing. For example, they do not consider the requirement in 
information disclosure and higher standards of law and regulation as benefits in the 
sense that these signal the better quality of the cross-listed firms. Second, the 
respondents may not give true answers in the surveys. For these reasons, surveys 
may not be particularly insightful. In the following parts, theoretical studies on the 
economics implications of cross-listing and empirical researches based on financial 
and accounting data are introduced. 
2.2 The theory of the legal bonding hypothesis 
To explain the phenomenon of cross-listing, Coffee (1999) argues that different 
stock exchanges have different functions and legal requirements. Firms with 
different goals may choose to list on foreign stock exchanges and subject to foreign 
governance standards. Coffee (1999) suggests that the positive abnormal price 
movement of a U.S. cross-listed firm is due to the bonding mechanism, i.e. the firm 
voluntarily complies with higher regulatory and disclosure standards. Moreover, 
Coffee (2002) points out that law is an important factor for those firms having 
financial stress to obtain external finance, this is because without the guarantee of 
high standards of law and regulation and strong investor protection, the firms cannot 
achieve a high equity valuation. Hence, cross-listing provides an option for these 
firms to bond themselves under a stringent legal and regulatory system. The author 
goes on to predict that firms with weak corporate governance and controlling 
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shareholders will be less likely to choose to cross-list on a stock exchange with high 
standards of law and regulation. Therefore, the author concludes that stock 
exchanges with high and low legal and disclosure standards will co-exist, and attract 
firms with different corporate governance qualities. 
2.3 Studies supporting the legal bonding hypothesis 
To test the legal bonding hypothesis, Reese and Weisbach (2002) show that despite 
the fact that most firms have subsequent equity issues after cross-listing on U.S. 
stock exchanges, firms from regions with weaker shareholder protection are more 
likely to have equity issues after a U.S. cross-listing. Moreover, firms from regions 
with weaker shareholder protection get higher new equity proceeds after a U.S. 
cross-listing. This reflects that before cross-listing on U.S. stock exchanges, firms 
from regions with weaker shareholder proection faced difficulties in raising capital 
by equity issuing, so they tend to raise more capital by equity issuing thereafter. 
Another early empirical study of legal bonding hypothesis is Doidge, Karolyi and 
Stulz (2004), the authors find out that foreign companies cross-listed on the U.S. 
exchanges have a higher Tobin’s q ratio than those from the same country without a 
U.S. cross-listing. Furthermore, for firms with higher growth opportunity, which is 
proxied by sales growth, the increase in Tobin’s q after a U.S. cross-listing is higher. 
The authors suggest that the controlling shareholders of U.S. cross-listed firms tend 
to be willing to restrain from expropriating the capital of the firms and thus enhance 
the value of the growth opportunity.  
Until then, the empirical results are not convincing enough to prove the relationship 
between corporate governance and cross-listing. This is because the higher 
probability of equity issues and Tobin’s q may not be caused by the stronger investor 
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protection, but is caused by other factors, such as the depth and liquidity of the U.S. 
equity market. Nevertheless, later studies by testing the relationship between 
cross-listing and variables reflecting corporate governance, such as voting premium, 
CEO turnover, and valuation of investors on excessive cash, give stronger support 
for the legal bonding hypothesis.  
The voting premium of a dual class equity, i.e. the price of the high voting shares 
minus the price of low voting shares, is negatively related to the quality of corporate 
governance. Therefore, Doidge (2004) argues that provided the existence of the legal 
bonding effect, the voting premium should decrease after a U.S. cross-listing. 
Empirical results suggest that during the announcement of the U.S. cross-listing, 
both the price of high voting shares and low voting shares increase, but the low 
voting shares increase more. The decrease in the voting premium thus is an evidence 
that the legal bonding effect of U.S. cross-listing improves the corporate governance 
and reduces the value of private control. 
One of the most direct tests of the corporate governance quality of cross-listed firm 
is Lel and Miller (2008). The authors point out that a higher probability of 
replacement of CEOs with poor performance reflects the higher corporate 
governance quality of a firm. Results show that, firms from countries with weaker 
investor protection have a stronger negative relationship between the CEO turnover 
and firm performance after a cross-listing. However, this phenomenon only exists 
among firms cross-listed on exchanges with stringent regulation, such as exchanges 
of the United States. 
Because of the liquidity feature, cash is regarded as the asset which is the easiest to 
be expropriated by the insiders. Without sufficient investor protection, investors 
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should place a lower value on the excess cash holding by a firm. Nevertheless, 
Frésard and Salva (2010) show that a U.S. cross-listing increases the value of the 
excessive cash. The authors conclude that a U.S. cross-listing can effectively lower 
the risk of expropriation of the excessive cash by the insiders. 
2.4 Studies questioning the legal bonding hypothesis 
Licht (2003) suggests that in the perspective of the cross-listed firms, the legal 
bonding effect is only second order important. The first order consideration is to 
increase the visibility. The author further points out that, for this reason, the U.S. 
regulatory authority has lighter legal requirements on corporate governance for 
foreign listed firms than domestic listed firm in order to attract foreign firms to list 
on the U.S. exchanges. For example, foreign listed firms are able to easily get 
exemption from the equity listing requirements on corporate governance. 
More evidences questioning the legal bonding hypothesis is found by Siegel (2005). 
Although the cross-listed firms are under the law and regulation of the United States, 
the author finds out that from 1994 to 2002, the SEC (Security Exchange 
Commission) only took real legal action against 13 foreign cross-listed firms. 
Furthermore, the author points out that the SEC never took legal action against 
cross-listed firms from Brazil, Mexico (the author shows that from 1994 to 2002, 
there were at least 16 insider asset takings among the Mexican U.S. cross-listed 
firms), Russia, and South Korea. Besides, the author shows that U.S. cross-listed 
firms from Mexico have a higher probability of insider asset taking (legal or illegal) 
from investors than non-U.S.-cross-listed firms. Therefore, in fact, the legal 
enforcement of SEC on cross-listed firms is not strong. The author, however, 
suggests that the reputation bonding rather than the legal bonding is the cause of the 
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improvement in corporate governance of the cross-listed firms. The study discovers 
that, the Mexican U.S. cross-listed firms which did not engage in asset taking from 
investors were more likely to raise external capital in the later period. The author 
concludes that although the legal enforcement is weak, the better information 
environment, such as the business press and equity analysis, serves as a reputation 
bonding which motivates the U.S. cross-listed firms to improve their corporate 
governance. 
King and Segal (2005) suggest that not all the cross-listings are necessarily 
accompanied by legal bonding. The authors use the sample of Canadian firms and 
find out that for single class firms, the value increase caused by the U.S. 
cross-listing is only temporary unless the U.S. investor base, i.e. investor recognition, 
expands. For dual class firms, however, regardless of the U.S. investor base, there is 
a permanent increase in Tobin’s q ratio. The authors argue that the bonding effect 
only exists among firms with weak investor protection. 
Nevertheless, Sarkissian and Schill (2008) reject both the legal bonding and investor 
recognition hypothesis. They suggest that all the valuation gain from different 
characteristics of the exchanges, such as liquidity, higher legal standard, and from 
characteristic of the cross-listed firms, i.e. larger shareholder base, are temporary, 
except valuation gain from increase disclosure. 
2.5 Studies supporting the information improvement hypothesis 
As Siegel (2005) suggests that the law enforcement on cross-listed firms may be 
overstated, and the reputation bonding is the main reason for cross-listed firms to 
improve their corporate governance. Therefore, we should see an improvement in 
information environment after a U.S. cross-listing. 
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One of the earliest studies of cross-listing and information environment is Baker, 
Nofsinger and Weaver(2002). Using both regression and industrial and geographical 
matching, results show that the number of following analysts increases after the 
firms cross-listed on NYSE or LSE. The increase is higher for firms cross-listed on 
NYSE. Moreover, after the cross-listing, firms with more following analysts have 
lower capital cost.  
Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) discover similar phenomena. The study first finds out 
that a U.S. cross-listing increases the number of analyst coverages of a firm. Second, 
a U.S. cross-listing improves the earnings forecast accuracy of the equity analysts. 
Also, the study discovers that the U.S. cross-listed firms with more analyst 
coverages and higher earnings forecast accuracy have higher valuation.  
The degree of earning management is an important indicator measuring the quality 
of information environment. Lang, Raedy and Yetman(2003) show that the variation 
of net income of firms with a U.S. cross- listing is higher than those without. 
Moreover, firms have higher variation of net income in post-U.S.-cross-listing 
period than pre-U.S.-cross-listing period. Therefore, U.S. cross-listing deters earning 
smoothing activities. In addition, the study finds out that the accounting data of U.S. 
cross-listed firms contain higher quality information than non-U.S.-cross-listed firms. 
This is because, by regressing the equity price on the accounting data, the R-squared 
of the sample of U.S. cross-listed firms is higher than non-U.S.-cross-listed firms.  
Although traditional theory suggests that price discoveries are mainly contributed by 
the home market from where the relevant information is generated. Eun and 
Sabherwal (2003) point out that the cross-listing market is also an important 
contributor of price discoveries. Using the sample of Canadian firms listed on both 
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TSE (Toronto Stock Exchange) and a U.S. exchange, the study shows that about 
40% of the price discoveries are generated from the U.S. market. Also, the share of 
price discoveries of the U.S. market is higher for firms with higher U.S. trading 
proportion, particularly for the medium size trades, i.e. the informative trades. 
Another study about the price discovery of the cross-listing equity is Su and Chong 
(2007). Using a sample of eight firms from China cross-listed on Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and NYSE, the authors discover that the price sequences on Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange and NYSE of these eight firms are cointegrated with a common 
factor. Moreover, 85% of the price discoveries are from Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 
while 15% are from NYSE. The authors argue that there are two possible reasons for 
the high share of price discoveries generated from Hong Kong Stock Exchange. One 
is the information advantage because of the geographical proximity. Another is the 
trading hours of Hong Kong Stock Exchange are 12 hours after the close of NYSE. 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) indirectly prove the information environment 
improvement effect of cross-listing by decomposing the variation of the equity 
returns into two parts. One part is related to the market wide variation, i.e. the 
systematic volatility. The remaining part is related to the firm specific information, 
i.e. the idiosyncratic volatility. Therefore, if a U.S. cross-listing improves the 
information environment of the firms, we should find out that the ratio of 
idiosyncratic returns volatility to total returns volatility of the U.S. cross-listed firm 
is higher than that of the non-U.S.-cross-listed firms. The empirical findings show 
that U.S. cross-listing improves the information environment for firms from 
developed countries but not developing countries. Moreover, for U.S. cross-listed 
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firms from developing countries, increase in analyst coverage actually decreases the 
information environment. 
Extending the strategic disclosure model of Shin (2003), Goto, Watanabe and Xu 
(2008) argue that under the lack of high information disclosure standard, risk-averse 
investors are more skeptical about the information provided by the managers. For 
example, if the firm discloses a few good news, i.e. small expected cash flow, the 
investors expect that there is some bad news withheld by the firm managers. For this 
uncertainty, the risk-averse investors require higher expected equity returns. 
Therefore, we should find a negative correlation between the expected cash flow and 
expected returns. And because of this reason, the equity returns reversal of these 
firms should be strong. However, if cross-listing can enhance the information 
disclosure standard, these statistical relationships will be weaker. Actually, the 
authors find out that the negative correlation between expected cash flow and 
expected equity returns and the phenomenon of equity returns reversal decrease 
significantly after the firm cross-listed on the U.S. exchanges. 
2.6 Studies questioning the information improvement hypothesis 
There are, however, studies questioning the information environment improvement 
caused by a U.S. cross-listing. For example, Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2006) argue 
that if a U.S. cross-listing enhances the disclosure standard and thus the information 
environment, we should find out that the abnormal returns and abnormal trading 
volumes after an earnings announcement are lower for firms with U.S. cross-listing. 
The authors, however, show that the results are contrary to the assumption. More 
surprisingly, the higher abnormal returns and higher abnormal trading volumes are 
mainly concentrated in U.S. cross-listed firms with higher S&P disclosure scores. 
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Although some studies suggest that firms with cross-listing on the U.S. exchanges 
engage in less earning management than those without, Lang, Raedy and Wilson 
(2006) show that the quality of the accounting information of U.S. cross-listed firms 
is lower than that of the U.S. domestic firms. Results indicate that the variations of 
accounting earnings of the U.S. cross-listed firms are smaller than the U.S. domestic 
firms. Within the cross-listing sample, firms from countries with weaker investor 
protection have smoother earning. Moreover, comparing with the U.S. domestic 
firms, the accounting data of the U.S. cross-listed firms is less correlated with the 
equity returns. The authors conclude that the SEC dose not effectively enhance the 
accounting standard of cross-listed firms to a level of the U.S. domestic firms. 
In addition, Ndubizu (2007) argue that cross-listing even increases the incentive of 
the firms to manage the earnings. First, the author shows that the return on assets, 
cash flows and discretionary accruals of the U.S. cross-listed firms reach the highest 
level during the cross-listing period, but decrease significantly in the years after the 
cross-listing event. Thus, the author suggests that the U.S. cross-listed firms either 
engage in earning management or timing the cross-listing. Second, the results show 
that during the cross-listing period, U.S. cross-listed firms have higher discretionary 
accruals than domestic firms listed on the U.S. exchanges with similar 
characteristics. 
2.7 Studies supporting the firm growth hypothesis 
As mentioned by Reese and Weisbach (2002), a U.S. cross-listing increases the 
probability of the subsequent equity issuing. Furthermore, King and Segal (2005) 
suggest that U.S. cross-listed firms have a larger investor base. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that, by improving the sources of external capital, a U.S. 
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cross-listing provides a larger benefit for firms with younger age and financial stress. 
Some empirical studies support this hypothesis. For example, Pagano, Röell and 
Zechner (2002) find out that firms cross-listed on the U.S. exchanges differ 
substantially from firms cross-listed on the European exchanges. In particular, U.S. 
cross-listed firms are characterized by higher total asset growth, higher market to 
book value and higher foreign sales percentage. The authors thus suggest that the 
motivation of a U.S. cross-listing may be the need for equity capital to support the 
expansion strategy of the growing companies. 
Khurana, Martin and Periera (2008) show that a U.S. cross-listing improves the 
financial condition and the firm growth. The authors decompose the firm growth rate 
into “internal financed growth rate”, i.e. the estimated maximum growth rate that 
can be achieved by only using the internal cash flows, short-term borrowing, and 
long-term loans, and “external financed growth rate”, i.e. the difference between the 
actual growth rate and the “internal financed growth rate”. Results show that, the 
“external financed growth rate” increases after the firms cross-listed on the U.S. 
exchanges. 
Using the implied cost of capital models, Hail and Leuz (2009) decompose the 
increase in equity price of firms cross-listed on the U.S. exchanges into components 
caused by the lower cost of capital and the higher growth expectation. They find out 
that for exchange listing ADRs, around half of the increase in equity price of the 
cross-listed firms is because of the higher growth expectation. Moreover, for the 
OTC (over the counter) ADRs, higher growth expectation explains almost all the 
increase in equity price. 
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Lin, Seade and Zhang (2010) examine the firm growth effect of the cross-listing on 
Chinese firms. Results show that among the three cross-listing markets, NYSE has 
the greatest positive effect on the growth of sales, investment, and ROA of the 
cross-listed firms, and it is followed by the Singapore Stock Exchange and Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. 
2.8 Predictability of institutional investors on equity returns 
Whether institutional investors possess the ability to predict stock returns is a long 
debated question. One of the empirical studies supports the view that institutional 
investors have the superior trading ability is Chakravarty (2001). The author argues 
that if most of the stock price changes are caused by public information, the 
proportion of cumulative price change of a specific category of trade should be 
closed to the ratio of the transaction of that specific category to the total transaction. 
The results reject this hypothesis by showing that nearly 80% of the cumulative 
price changes are caused by the medium-size trades initiated by institutional 
investors. The author thus concludes that the institutional investors are informed 
traders. 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) have a different conclusion. Using a sample of the U.S. 
firms, the authors argue that although the lag institutional ownership level is positive 
correlated with the equity returns, this does not imply the superior equity selection 
ability of the institutional owner. The positive correlation only reflects the price 
pressure on equity returns caused by the demand shock. When the authors 
decompose the lag institutional ownership into the lag first difference and level of 
second lag, the first difference, which reflects the information trades, positively but 
not significantly correlates with the equity returns. However, the level of second lag, 
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which reflects the long term preference of institutional investors, is positively and 
significantly correlated with the equity returns. 
Yan and Zhang (2009) extend the study of Gompers and Metrick (2001) by dividing 
the institutional investors into long term investors and short term investors. The 
sample includes firms based on the United States. The authors point out that 
institutional investors who possess superior information tend to exploit this 
information advantage frequently, while institutional investors without the 
information advantage trade more cautiously and less often. Therefore, the short 
term institutional investors are better informed than the long term institutional 
investors. By using a similar model to Gomper and Metrick (2001), the authors find 
out that the coefficient of the lag first difference of short term institutional 
ownership, but not long term institutional ownership, is positive and significant in 
the regressions with quarter returns and year returns as the dependent variables. This 
positive correlation is stronger for the sample of high growth firms. 
Another study extends the model of Gompers and Metrick (2001) is Baik, Kang and 
Kim (2010). The authors suggest that local institutional investors, because of the 
geographical proximity and the accessibility to local media, have more information 
advantage than non-local institutional investors. Concentrating on the sample of U.S. 
firms, the authors define local institutional investors as investors locating in the 
same state with the firm they invest, while non-local institutional investors as 
investors locating in states different from the firm they invest. The results show that 
the lag first difference of local institutional ownership is more significantly and 
positively correlated with equity returns. And the positive relationship is stronger for 
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firms with greater information cost, such as high growth firms, young firms, and 
firms with high returns volatility. 
To summarize, there are both studies support and question the legal bonding 
hypothesis and information environment improvement hypothesis. However, for the 
firm growth hypothesis, there are only supporting literatures. Moreover, most of the 
literatures support the equity returns predictability of the institutional investors.  
In the next chapter, first, empirical tests are developed in order to test the 
informational environment improvement hypothesis, the legal bonding hypothesis, 
and the firm growth hypothesis of cross-listing. Second, the empirical model and the 
definition of the data are presents. 
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Chapter 3 Hypotheses, Methodology and Data 
3.1 Hypotheses 
The previous chapter introduces the literatures about the informational environment 
improvement hypothesis, the legal bonding hypothesis, and the firm growth 
hypothesis. This chapter develops empirical tests to investigate these three 
hypotheses of cross-listing and describes the empirical model and the definition of 
the data. 
One of the main goals of this thesis is to investigate whether cross-listing on the U.S. 
exchanges enhances the information environment and thus improves the equity 
returns predictability of the institutional investors. First, I suggest that a better 
information environment can improve the investing skill of the institutional 
investors. Moreover, the regions with British common-law origin are regarded as 
regime with high quality of information environment because of the stringent 
disclosure standard. Therefore, I expect the ability of institutional investors in 
predicting equity returns of firms from British common-law regions is better than 
other legal origins. Therefore, I develop the following hypotheses, 
H1a. The changes in institutional ownership level in the previous period are 
positively correlated with the equity returns in the current period.  
H1b. The correlation between the changes in institutional ownership level in the 
previous period and the equity returns in the current period is higher for firms from 
common-law regions than firms from non-common-law regions. 
Since the information disclosure requirement and the quality of information 
environment of the U.S. exchanges are regarded as the highest in the world. 
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Therefore, cross-listing on the U.S. exchanges should improve the equity returns 
predictability of the institutional investors. Therefore, after a U.S. cross-listing, the 
ability of institutional investors in predicting equity returns should become stronger. 
Moreover, the increase in predictability should be higher for firms from 
non-common-law regions than common-law regions, reflecting the larger difference 
between the information environment of non-common-law regions and the United 
States. Therefore, I develop the following hypotheses, 
H2a. After a U.S. cross-listing, the correlation between the changes in institutional 
ownership level in the previous period and the equity returns in the current period 
will increase. 
H2b. The increase in correlation between the changes in institutional ownership 
level in the previous period and the equity returns in the current period caused by a 
U.S. cross-listing is higher for firms from non-common-law regions than firms from 
common-law regions. 
Besides, the legal bonding hypothesis suggests that a cross-listing on the U.S. 
exchanges can improve the legal standard and investor protection of a firm. 
Moreover, La Porta et al (1998) point out that, the regions with English 
common-law origin have the best shareholder protection. Therefore, I expect the 
equity returns of the U.S. cross-listed firms from non-common-law regions increase 
more during and after the cross-listing period than those from common-law regions. 
This is because the difference in legal standard between the United States and the 
non-common-law regions is larger. Therefore, I have the following hypothesis, 
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H3.The correlations between the U.S. cross-listing dummies and the equity returns 
should be higher for firms from non-common-law regions than firms from 
common-law regions. 
Furthermore, the firm growth hypothesis argues that a U.S. cross-listing improves 
the financial condition and thus enhances the growth of a firm. Therefore, the equity 
returns of firms with younger age and lower dividend yield should increase more 
after a U.S. cross-listing. Therefore, I have the following hypotheses, 
H4a. The correlations of U.S. cross-listing dummies and the equity returns should be 
higher for firms with younger age.  
H4a. The correlations of U.S. cross-listing dummies and the equity returns should be 
higher for firms with lower dividend yield. 
3.2 Methodology  
Since this thesis analyzes whether U.S. cross-listing enhances the information 
environment and equity returns predictability of the institutional investors, I apply 
and extend the model of Gompers and Metrick (2001) because the research subjects 
are similar and the model is widely used in later similar studies, such as Yan and 
Zhang (2009) and Baik, Kang and Kim (2010). The regression model is as follows, 
Raw Equity returnsi,t = αt + γ(ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t) + µ(U.S. Cross-listi,t-1) + η(ΔNo. 
of IOsi,t-1 ) +ν( (U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1) ) + θ(No. of IOsi,t-2) + β 
(Control Variablesi,t-1) + ε 
In the following part, the definition of variables are explained. 
 
24 
 
3.3 Dependent variables 
In this thesis, the sample data are from 23 developed regions from the first half of 
2006 to the first half of 2011. Because of the insufficiency of institutional ownership 
data, the frequency of the regression analyses in this study is semi-annual. The 
developing regions are not included because the data of direct ownership of 
institutional investors from OSIRIS database is inadequate for firms from 
developing regions. Also, the data of direct ownership of institutional investors of 
firms from developed regions from OSIRIS database are also not enough before 
2005 (Since first lag and second lag variables are included in the regressions, so the 
sample period in the regression analyses is from the first half of 2006). 
Raw Equity Returnsi,t 
The dependent variable is the raw equity returns in the current period. The raw 
equity return is,  
(USD Equity price in period t -USD Equity price in period t-1) / USD Equity price 
in period t-1 
Since the firms may pay stock dividend or split their stock during the sample period, 
the raw equity price may not be relevant. Therefore, the USD equity price is the 
daily closing price at the end of June or December, i.e. PRCCD in Compustat, 
divided by the cumulative adjustment factor, i.e. AJEXDI in Compustat, and then 
adjusted by the corresponding daily exchange rate provided by Datastream, in order 
to convert the price into U.S. dollar. Semi-annual data are from Compustat. 
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Industrial Adjusted Equity Returnsi,t 
In the robustness test, the dependent variable is the industrial adjusted equity returns. 
This is because the equity returns mainly contain two parts, one reflects the business 
condition of the industrial sector and another reflects the firm specific factors. 
Therefore, studying the effects of U.S. cross-listing on the industrial adjusted returns 
can help us to understand the benefit of U.S. cross-listing more precisely. If U.S. 
cross-listing has impacts on the firms, the impacts on the industrial adjusted returns 
should be also statistically significant. This is because the industrial adjusted returns 
reflect only the firm, while the raw returns may include market wide factors and 
contain more noise. The industrial adjusted returns are the raw returns net of the 
returns of an equally weighted portfolio containing firms in the same industry 
according to the Fama-French 48 industry sectors. 
3.4 Key independent variables 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 
The variable U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 is a dummy variable of the U.S. cross-listing status of 
firm i in the previous period. If the firm had cross-listing on the NYSE, NASDAQ 
or Amex in the previous period, U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 equals to one. Otherwise, U.S. 
Cross-listi,t-1 equals to zero. Semi-annual data are from Compustat, Bank of New 
York, JP-Morgan, NYSE-Euronext and NASDAQ.
 
ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t 
The variableΔU.S. Cross-listi,t is the first difference of the U.S. cross-listing dummy 
in the current period, i.e. if the firm started a U.S. cross-listing in the current period, 
ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t equals one. Otherwise, Δ U.S. Cross-listi,t equals to zero. 
26 
 
Semi-annual data are from Compustat, Bank of New York, JP-Morgan, 
NYSE-Euronext and NASDAQ. 
ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 
The variable ΔNo of IOsi is the first difference of institutional ownership level in 
the previous period. Since in the OSIRIS direct ownership database, many 
institutional ownership observations only record whether the institutional owner 
holds a specific firm in a specific period, but not the percentage of shareholding, 
using the percentage ownership will cause large information missing. In this thesis, 
the number of institutional investors is used as a proxy for the institutional 
ownership level. Institutional investors include banks, financial companies, hedge 
funds, insurance companies, mutual and pension fund/nominee/trust/trustee. 
Semi-annual data are from Osiris. 
No. of IOsi,t-2 
The variable No. of IOsi,t-2 is the institutional ownership level in the second previous 
period, i.e. the number of institutional owners in the second previous period. 
Semi-annual data are from Osiris. 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 is the interaction term of U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 andΔ
No. of IOsi,t-1. 
3.5 The control variables 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) use control variables to control the long term 
preference of the institutional owners. This is because long term preference of the 
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institutional investors can produce a price pressure on the equity. Thus, the 
correlation between the institutional ownership and the equity returns may reflect 
the price pressure on the equity returns, but not the information advantage of the 
institutional investors. Therefore, the following control variables, as suggested by 
Gompers and Metrick (2001), are included in the regression analyses to control the 
effect of long term preference of the institutional investors. 
Equity returnsi,t-1 and Equity returnsi,t-2 
Equity returnsi,t-1 and Equity returnsi,t-2 are the raw equity returns of firm i in the first 
and second previous periods respectively. These two variables reflect the momentum 
of the equity returns. Gompers and Metrick (2001) argue that institutional investors 
may have superior knowledge about the historical pattern of the equity price and 
exploit this pattern to earn abnormal returns. Semi-annual data are from Compustat 
(equity price) and Datastream (exchange rate). 
BTVi,t-1 
BTVi,t-1 denotes the book to market ratio of firm i in the previous period. It is another 
variable represents the price momentum of the equity. It is the book value in 
thousands of USD of firm i divided by the market capitalization in thousands of 
USD of firm i. The book value is the total assets net of total liabilities. Annual book 
value data are from Osiris. Semi-annual market capitalization data are from 
Compustat. 
Log MKCi,t-1 
Log MKCi,t-1 denotes the natural logarithm of market capitalization in thousands of 
U.S. dollar of firm i in the previous period. As mentioned by Gompers and Metrick 
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(2001), the market capitalization reflects the size of a firm. One of the important 
considerations of institutional investors when choosing equity is the transaction cost 
and liquidity. High market capitalization firms are usually more liquid. The market 
capitalization is the daily closing price at the end of June or December, i.e. PRCCD 
in Compustat, multiplied by the total shares outstanding at the end of June or 
December, i.e. CSHOC in Compustat, and then adjusted by the corresponding 
exchange rates provided by Datastream. 
Turnoveri,t-1 
Turnoveri,t-1 denotes the ratio of total turnover to total shares outstanding of firm i in 
the previous period. This variable indicates the liquidity and transaction cost of the 
firm. It is the total trading volume in the previous period, i.e. CSHTRD in 
Compustat, divided by the average total shares outstanding in the previous period, 
i.e. CSHOC in Compustat. The frequency is semi-annual. 
Log pricei,t-1 
Log pricei,t-1 denotes the natural logarithm of the equity price in U.S. dollar of firm i 
in the previous period. As pointed out by Gompers and Metrick (2001), low-priced 
stock involves higher transaction cost. The equity price is the daily closing price at 
the end of June or December, i.e. PRCCD in Compustat, divided by the cumulative 
adjustment factor, i.e. AJEXDI in Compustat, and then adjusted by the 
corresponding daily exchange rates provided by Datastream in order to convert the 
price into U.S. dollar. The frequency is semi-annual. 
Agei,t-1 
29 
 
Agei,t-1 denotes the monthly age of the firm i in the previous period. Gompers and 
Metrick (2001) argue that the institutional investors are characterized by prudence. 
Firm age is one of the proxies of the risk of the firms. Agei,t-1 is the number of 
months since the first price observation appeared in Compustat in the previous 
period. Since the earliest year of the Global Daily Security Database in Compustat is 
1984, if the firm existed before 1984, in this study, the firm can only be regarded as 
a firm started at the January of 1984. 
DVYi,t-1 
DVYi,t-1 denotes the dividend yield of firm i in the previous period. It indicates the 
risk of the firm. It is the total dividend per share of firm i in the previous period, i.e. 
DIV in Compustat, adjusted by the corresponding exchange rates at the end of the 
previous period provided by Datastream, in order to convert the dividend per share 
into U.S. dollar, and then divided by the USD equity price. The frequency is 
semi-annual. 
S&Pi,t-1 
In Gompers and Metrick (2001), the S&P variable is the membership of S&P 500. 
However, the sample of this study is firms from 23 developed regions not including 
the United States. Therefore, in this study, S&Pi,t-1 is the dummy variable of 
membership of S&P Global 1200 Index or S&P/TSX Composite Index in the 
previous period. The membership dummy represents the risk of the firm. S&Pi,t-1 
equals to one if the firm was included in either or both of the indexes in the previous 
period. Otherwise, S&Pi,t-1equals to zero. Semi-annual data are from Compustat. 
VRi,t-1 
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VRi,t-1 denotes the monthly equity returns volatility of the twenty months before the 
previous period. It reflects the risk of the firm. It is the variance of monthly returns 
of the twenty months before the previous period. The monthly return is,  
(USD Equity price in month i -USD Equity price in month i-1) / USD Equity price in 
month i-1 
The USD equity price in month i is the daily closing price at the end of each month, 
i.e. PRCCD in Compustat, divided by the cumulative adjustment factor, i.e. AJEXDI 
in Compustat, and then adjusted by the corresponding daily exchange rates provided 
by Datastream, in order to convert the price into U.S. dollar. The frequency is 
semi-annual 
Other dummy variables 
Other dummy variables include industrial sector dummies according to 
Fama-French 48 industrial sectors, country dummies and semi-annual period 
dummies. 
3.6 The decomposition of the institutional ownership variable 
The reason for decomposing the No of IOsi,t-1 into ΔNo of IOsi,t-1 and No of IOsi,t-2 
is to distinguish the informed trades from the long term demand shock of the 
institutional investors. As suggested by Gompers and Metrick (2001), the level of 
institutional investors, i.e. No of IOsi,t-2, is more stable and reflects the long term 
demand preference of the institutional investors, since it is accumulated in many 
periods. Therefore, the coefficient of No of IOsi,t-2 represents the price pressure of 
this long term demand, but not the superior information of institutional owners. 
However, the first difference, i.e. ΔNo of IOsi,t-1, represents the growth of the 
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number of institutional investors in one period and is more noisy. This short term 
and small fraction of demand change thus reflects the informed trades. The positive 
coefficient ofΔNo of IOsi,t-1 is an evidence of the information advantage of the 
institutional investors. 
3.7 Additional control variables for robustness analyses 
In the original model of Gompers and Metrick (2001), the cross-listing variables are 
not included, the control variables only include factors affecting the institutional 
investor ownership, but not those affecting the cross-listing decision. Therefore, 
after adding the cross-listing variables, additional variables should be controlled in 
order to minimize the endogenous effect of cross-listing. In the robust regression 
analyses, the following additional control variables are included. 
Sales growthi,t-1 
Sales growthi,t-1 is the semi-annual sales growth rate of firm i in the previous period, 
which proxies for the growth prospect of the firms. As pointed out by King and 
Segal (2009), firms with higher growth opportunity are more likely to cross-list. It is 
the changes in semi-annual sales, i.e. changes in the summation of two quarterly 
sales (SALEQ in Compustat), in the previous period, divided by the semi-annual 
sales in the second previous period. If there is no information about the Sales 
growthi,t-1 of the observation, the Sales growthi,t-1 is treated as zero in order to avoid 
missing observation. The frequency is semi-annual. 
Leveragei,t-1 
Leveragei,t-1 is the leverage of firm i in the previous period. King and Segal (2009) 
use the leverage as the proxy for the growth opportunity of the firm, which is 
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regarded as a factor affecting the cross-listing decision. It is the total liabilities in the 
second quarter and fourth quarter, i.e. ATQ in Compustat, divided by the total assets 
in the second quarter and fourth quarter, i.e. LTQ in Compustat, respectively. The 
frequency is semi-annual. 
Proportion of foreign salesi,t-1 
Proportion of foreign salesi,t-1 is the ratio of the foreign sales to total sales of firm i 
in the previous period. The data are from Osiris. As pointed out by King and Segal 
(2009), the higher the proportion of foreign sales, the higher the probability of 
cross-listing. If there is no information about Proportion of foreign salesi,t-1 
of the observation, Proportion of foreign salesi,t-1 is treated as zero in order to avoid 
missing observation. The frequency is semi-annual. 
Log Total assetsi,t-1 
Log Total assetsi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the total assets in thousands of USD of 
firm i in the previous period. King and Segal (2009) suggest that total assets 
indicates firm size, and firm size is one of the factor affecting the cross-listing 
decision. Annual data are from Osiris.  
ROAi,t-1 
ROAi,t-1 is the return on assets in percentage of firm i in the previous period. King 
and Segal (2009) argue that the ROA reflects the profitability of the firm, and firms 
with higher profitability are more likely to cross-list. The data are from Osiris. The 
frequency is annual. 
3.8 Cross-listing on London Stock Exchange 
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Some firms have cross-listing on the U.S. stock exchanges may also have 
cross-listing on LSE (London Stock Exchange). Since LSE is also a common-law 
international financial center, a cross-listing on LSE may provide similar effects to a 
cross-listing on the U.S. stock exchanges. Excluding the LSE cross-listing variables 
may over-estimate the bonding effect of the U.S. cross-listing for firms cross-listing 
their equity on both LSE and the U.S. stock exchanges. Therefore, the LSE 
cross-listing variables are added to the original regression model. 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1 
The variable LSE Cross-listi,t-1 is a dummy variable of the LSE cross-listing status of 
firm i in the previous period. If the firm had cross-listing on the LSE in the previous 
period, LSE Cross-listi,t-1 equals to one. Otherwise, LSE Cross-listi,t-1 equals to zero. 
Semi-annual data are from Compustat, Bank of New York, JP-Morgan, and LSE. 
ΔLSE Cross-listi,t 
The variable ΔLSE Cross-listi,t is the first difference of the LSE cross-listing 
dummy in the current period, i.e. if the firm started or stopped a LSE cross-listing in 
the current period, ΔLSE Cross-listi,t equals to one or negative one respectively. 
Otherwise, ΔLSE Cross-listi,t equals to zero. Semi-annual data are from Compustat, 
Bank of New York, JP-Morgan, and LSE. 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 is the interaction term of LSE Cross-listi,t-1 andΔ
No. of IOsi,t-1. 
3.9 Cross-listing on exchanges other than the U.S. exchanges and LSE 
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Some firms in the sample period listed their equity on exchanges other than the U.S. 
exchanges and LSE. Therefore, it is interesting to study whether cross-listing on 
these exchanges provides the similar benefits to cross-listing on the U.S. exchanges 
or LSE. Therefore, the global cross-listing variables are added to the original 
regression model. 
Global Cross-listi,t-1 
The variable Global Cross-listi,t-1 is a dummy variable of the global cross-listing 
status of firm i in the previous period. If the firm had cross-listing on the exchanges 
other than the U.S. exchanges and LSE in the previous period, i.e., the firm listed the 
equity on exchanges of more than two countries/regions other than the U.S. 
exchanges and LSE in the previous period, Global Cross-listi,t-1 equals to one. 
Otherwise, Global Cross-listi,t-1 equals to zero. Semi-annual data are from 
Compustat. 
ΔGlobal Cross-listi,t-1 
The variable ΔGlobal Cross-listi,t is the first difference of the global cross-listing 
dummy in the current period, i.e. if the firm started or stopped a global cross-listing 
in the current period, Δ Global Cross-listi,t equals to one or negative one 
respectively. Otherwise, ΔGlobal Cross-listi,t equals to zero. Semi-annual data are 
from Compustat. 
Global Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 
Global Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 is the interaction term of Global Cross-listi,t-1 
andΔNo. of IOsi,t-1. 
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This chapter presents the hypotheses development, empirical model and data 
definitions. In the next chapter, summary statistics, empirical results of the 
information improvement hypothesis, the legal bonding hypothesis, the firm growth 
hypothesis of cross-listing, and the robustness tests are analyzed.  
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Chapter 4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Summary statistics  
Table 1 reports that there are totally 12,532 firms in the sample. Out of which, 238, 
147 and 360 firms had cross-listing on the U.S. exchanges, LSE and exchanges other 
than the U.S. exchanges and LSE during the sample period respectively. More than 
half of the firms with a U.S. cross-listing were from Canada. For LSE cross-listed 
firms, around half were from Australia and Ireland. This is not surprising. As 
showed by Sarkissian and Schill (2004), geographical, cultural and economic 
proximity are the main factors in the selection of overseas listing markets.  
Table 2a, Table 2b, Table 2c, Table 2d and Table 2e report the summary statistics of 
the dependent variables and the independent variables of the whole sample and the 
sub-sample of non-cross-listed firms, U.S. cross-listed firms, LSE cross-listed firms 
and firms cross-listed on exchanges other than the U.S. exchanges and LSE 
respectively. All variables, except Δ No. of IOsi,t-1, No. of IOsi,t-2, and the 
cross-listing dummies, are winsorized in the lowest 1% and highest 1% distribution. 
Comparing the firms with cross-listing, especially for U.S. cross-listing and LSE 
cross-listing, and firms without cross-listing, the firm characteristics were very 
different.  
For example, on average, the equity returns of cross-listed firms were higher than 
non-cross-listed firms. Moreover, the average returns volatility of cross-listed firms 
was lower than non-cross-listed firms. The mean age of cross-listed firms was lower 
than non-cross-listed firms. This may be because most of the cross-listed firms were 
young and growing firms. Also, cross-listed firms were characterized by higher 
turnover, higher market capitalization, lower book to market ratio and lower 
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dividend yield. Furthermore, the average number of institutional investors of the 
cross-listed firms was more than two times as the non-cross-listed firms.  
Table 2f reports the time series of number of firms with U.S. cross-listing, firms 
with LSE cross-listing and firms with cross-listing on exchanges other than the U.S. 
exchanges and LSE during the sample period. Table 2f shows the summary statistics 
of these three time series. All three time series show increasing trends. 
4.2 Test of information environment hypothesis 
Table 3 reports the regression results of equity returns against institutional 
ownership variables and the control variables. Column 1 reports the results of the 
whole sample regression. The results are similar to the study of Gompers and 
Metrick (2001). The level of number of institutional investors, No. of IOsi,t-2, which 
proxies for the long term demand shock, is positively and significantly correlated 
with the equity returns, indicating that the long term demand preference produces a 
positive price pressure on the equity price. However, the coefficient of the changes 
in the number of institutional investors, ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1, which proxies for the 
informed trades of institutional investors, is positive but not significant. Therefore, 
the results reject the hypothesis H1a that institutional investors can predict future 
equity returns. 
Column 2 of Table 3 reports the regression results of the sub-sample of firms from 
common-law regions. The results are striking. For firms from common-law regions, 
not only the level of number of institutional investors, No. of IOsi,t-2, is positively 
and significantly correlated with the future equity returns, but the coefficient of the 
changes in number of institutional investors, ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1, is also positive and 
significant at 1% level. If the number of institutional investors increases by one, the 
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equity returns in the next period increase by 0.14%. Column 3 of Table 3 reports the 
regression results of the sub-sample of firms from non-common-law countries. For 
firms from non-common-law regions, only the coefficient of level of number of 
institutional investors, No. of IOsi,t-2, is positive and significant. The coefficient of 
the first difference of number of institutional investors, ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1, is positive 
but not significant. Therefore, superior equity selection ability is limited to firms 
from common-law regions. The hypothesis H1b that institutional investors have 
better equity returns predictability on firms from common-law regions than firms 
from non-common-law regions is accepted. 
Columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 3 extend the regression model by including the 
interception and interaction terms of the U.S. cross-listing variable, i.e. ΔU.S. 
Cross-listi,t, U.S. Cross-listi,t-1, and U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1. For all three 
samples, coefficients of the interaction terms between the U.S. cross-listing variable 
and changes in number of institutional investors, U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1, 
are significantly positive. Therefore, cross-listing on the U.S. exchanges improves 
the information environment and thus enhances the equity returns predictability of 
the institutional investors. The hypothesis H2a is accepted. 
Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term between the U.S. cross-listing and 
the changes in number of institutional investors, U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1, 
is higher for firms from non-common-law regions than common-law regions. For 
U.S. cross-listed firms from common-law regions, one more institutional investor 
increases equity returns by around 0.28%, of which 0.17% is from the extra effect of 
the U.S. cross-listing. For U.S. cross-listed firms from non-common-law regions, 
one more institutional investor increases the equity returns by 0.21%, all of which is 
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contributed by the extra effect of the U.S. cross-listing. The results support the 
hypothesis H2b that the information environment improvement caused by U.S. 
cross-listing is stronger for firms from non-common-law regions. This indicates the 
bigger difference in information environment between the United States and the 
non-common-law regions. 
4.3 Test of the firm growth hypothesis 
As showed by Guariglia (2008), young firms are more likely to face financial 
constraint. Moreover, Lau (1987) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) argue that 
low dividend payout is one of the evidence of financial stress. I suggest that the 
positive effects of U.S. cross-listing on equity returns is because of the improvement 
in the financial condition of the young firms and firms with lower dividend yield.  
Table 4 reports the regression results of split samples by mean of firm age, dividend 
yield during the sample period. Column 1 shows that, for firms with sample period 
mean age lower than the sample period median, the coefficient of first difference of 
the cross-listing dummy, ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t, is positive and significant. Therefore, 
in the cross-listing period, there is an extra equity return more than 25% temporarily. 
The coefficient of the lag level of the cross-listing dummy, U.S. Cross-listi,t-1, is also 
positive and significant, implying that cross-listing increases the equity returns by 
about 5.6% permanently. However, column 2 shows that similar results do not 
appear in firms with sample period mean age higher than the sample period median. 
The results support the hypothesis H4a. This is because when comparing with higher 
age firms, young firms usually have more growth opportunity and face financial 
stress, and U.S. cross-listing provides more sources for the young firms to obtain 
external finance and thus help the young firms to realize the growth opportunity. 
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 report the regression results of firms with sample period 
mean dividend yield lower and higher than the sample period median respectively. 
For firms with sample period mean dividend yield lower than the sample period 
median, the coefficient of the lag level of U.S. cross-listing variable, U.S. 
Cross-listi,t-1, is positive and significant. This implies that firms with lower dividend 
yield enjoy around 5% permanent increase in equity returns after a U.S. cross-listing. 
However, this permanent increase does not exist for firms with sample period mean 
dividend yield higher than the median. The results support the hypothesis H4b. The 
reason is comparing with firms with lower dividend yield, firms with higher 
dividend yield usually are mature firms without financial stress.  
4.4 Test on legal bonding hypothesis 
In Table 3, the sign of coefficients of the interception terms of U.S. cross-listing are 
unexpected. The magnitude of the coefficients of the first difference and lag level of 
U.S. cross-listing dummy are lower for the non-common-law sample than the 
common-law sample. Therefore, the temporary and permanent increases in equity 
returns caused by U.S. cross-listing are higher for firms from common-law regions 
than those from non-common-law regions. This rejects the legal bonding hypothesis.  
The more unexpected result is that the coefficients of the first difference and lag 
level of U.S. cross-listing dummy in the common-law sample regression are positive 
and significant. This may be due to the U.S. cross-listed firms of the common-law 
sample are over represented by young firms. In Table 5, the sample is split into firms 
with sample period mean age lower and higher than the sample period median. The 
results still reject the legal bonding hypothesis because only the coefficient of the 
U.S. cross-listing variable of the young firms from common-law regions is positive 
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and significant. Therefore, U.S. cross-listing only has a permanent positive effect on 
young firms from common-law regions. One possible reason is the difference in 
corporate governance between the firms from common-law regions and 
non-common-law regions. Young firms are usually characterized by higher risk. 
However, investor protection can lower the risk faced by investors. Therefore, U.S. 
cross-listing improves the financial condition, growth opportunity, and the equity 
returns of young firms from common-law regions with good corporate governance, 
but not young firms from non-common-law regions with weak corporate 
governance.  
From Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5, results of the whole sample period support the 
information environment improvement hypothesis and the firm growth hypothesis, 
but not the legal bonding hypothesis. Moreover, positive effect on the equity returns 
of young firms is only limited to firms from common-law regions. These findings 
are consistent with some existing literatures. For example, in the survey of Fanto 
and Karmel (1997), U.S. listing foreign firms point out that the most important 
difficulties of a U.S. listing is the information disclosure, and in the survey of Bancel 
and Mittoo (2001), among the 9 options, on average, respondents rank disclosure of 
more information as the first important consequence of cross-listing, but the 
consequence of enhancing the internal procedures of management control is in the 
sixth rank. La Porta et al (2000) suggests that ADRs can improve the information 
environment but the strengthening in investor protection is limited. Empirical results 
of Siegel (2005) also show that the U.S. legal enforcement on foreign cross-listed 
firms is weak, while the reputation bonding is effective. For the firm growth effect 
which is only limited to firms from common-law regions, I suggest that the reason is 
still the difference in corporate governances. Lower age usually implies higher risk. 
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However, investor protection can lower the risk faced by investors. For example, 
Houston et al (2010) use the legal origin as the instrumental variable of creditor 
protection and find out that better creditor protection increases the risk-taking of the 
banks. Therefore, the risk of young firms from common-law regions with better 
investor protection is alleviated, and the financial stress can be solved. However, the 
risk of young firms from non-common-law regions remains, so the financial stress 
cannot be improved.   
4.5 Robustness tests – Additional variables 
The regression model of Gompers and Metrick (2001) only control the factors 
affecting the institutional ownership, but not those affecting the cross-listing 
decision. Therefore, in order to minimize the endogenous effect of cross-listing, 
control variables which determine the cross-listing decision should be included. As 
suggested by King and Segal (2009), sales growth, leverage, proportion of foreign 
sales, natural logarithm of total assets, and return on assets are factors affecting the 
cross-listing decision. This thesis does not apply the two-stage-least-squares 
regression. The reason is, as emphasized by Siegel (2005), “Most, if not all, 
instruments that one could list are invalid because they also have a direct effect on 
later firm performance.” Therefore, in the robustness analyses, these variables are 
included as additional control variables in the regressions. Also, the dependent 
variable is the industrial adjusted equity returns. The results of robustness analyses 
are showed in Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8. 
Table 6 reports the regression results of effects of U.S. cross-listing, number of 
institutional investors, and their interaction term on industrial adjusted returns, with 
the additional control variables. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report the regression results of 
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the whole sample, the common-law-sample and the non-common-law sample 
respectively. In all three regressions, the coefficients of the interaction term, U.S. 
Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1, are positive and significant. The results still support 
the H2a, i.e. U.S. cross-listing can improve information environment. However, the 
results do not support the H2b that the information environment improvement is 
stronger for U.S. cross-listed firms from non-common-law regions. This is because 
the coefficient of interaction term, U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1, of the 
common-law sample is greater than the non-common-law sample. In addition, the 
results still do not support the legal bonding hypothesis, i.e. H3. The coefficient ofΔ
U.S. Cross-listi,t is only positive and significant in the common-law sample, but not 
the non-common-law sample.  
The robust analyses support the firm growth hypothesis. Table 7 shows the split 
sample regression analyses by sample period mean age and sample period mean 
dividend yield with additional control variables. Columns 1 and 2 report the young 
firms and old firms respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the firms with lower 
dividend yield and higher dividend yield respectively. In column 1, the coefficient of
Δ U.S. Cross-listi,t is positive and significant at 5% level. Therefore, U.S. 
cross-listing has a temporary positive effect on the industrial adjusted return of 
young firms. In column 3, the coefficient ofΔU.S. Cross-listi,t is positive and 
significant at 10% level in the lower dividend yield sample. In Table 7, it seems that 
the evidences of firm growth hypothesis are weaker than the previous tests. 
However, this may be caused by the missing observations due to the inclusion of the 
variable Leveragei,t-1. Not all the observations in the previous tests have data of 
leverage. Also, the coefficients of the variable Leveragei,t-1 are not significant in all 
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the previous regressions. Table 8 shows the regression results without the variable 
Leveragei,t-1. With more observations, the evidences of firm growth hypothesis 
become stronger. Coefficients of both ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t and U.S. Cross-listi,t-1are 
positive and significant at 1% level in the younger firms sample. The U.S. 
cross-listing increases the industrial adjusted equity returns of the younger firms by 
around 25% temporarily and around 4% permanently. Moreover, the coefficient ofΔ
U.S. Cross-listi,t is positive and significant at 5% level in the lower dividend yield 
sample. The U.S. cross-listing increases the industrial adjusted equity return of the 
firms with lower dividend yield by 22% temporarily. The results of Table 8 still give 
strong supports for the firm growth hypothesis. 
4.6 Cross-listing on LSE as additional variables 
Another concern about the robustness is the effect of cross-listing on the LSE 
(London Stock Exchange). LSE is another common-law international financial 
center. Thus, the legal bonding effect, information environment improvement effect 
and growth improvement effect of a LSE cross-listing may be similar to those of 
cross-listing on U.S. exchanges. Excluding the LSE cross-listing variables may 
overestimate the positive effects of the U.S. cross-listing on firms with both U.S. 
cross-listing and LSE cross-listing. Therefore, regressions with LSE cross-listing 
variables as additional control variables are estimated and the results are reported in 
Table 9 and Table 10.  
Table 9 reports the regression results of the effects of U.S. cross-listing, number of 
institutional investors, and their interaction term on industrial adjusted returns, with 
LSE cross-listing variables as additional control variables. Columns 1, 2, and 3 
report the regression results of the whole sample, the common-law-sample and the 
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non-common-law sample respectively. In all regressions of Table 9, the sign and 
significance of coefficients of Δ U.S. Cross-listi,t, U.S. Cross-listi,t-1, and U.S. 
Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 are generally the same as previous test. Nevertheless, 
the coefficient of LSE cross-listing variables, i.e., Δ LSE Cross-listi,t, LSE 
Cross-listi,t-1, and LSE Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 are not significant in all three 
regressions. Therefore, a LSE cross-listing does not provide the same benefits as 
those offered by the U.S. exchanges. 
However, Table 10 shows some meaningful results about the LSE cross-listing. 
Table 10 shows the split sample regression analyses by sample period mean age and 
sample period mean dividend yield with LSE cross-listing variables as additional 
control variables. Columns 1 and 2 report the young firms and old firms respectively. 
Columns 3 and 4 report the firms with lower dividend yield and higher dividend 
yield respectively. Results still support the firm growth hypothesis of the U.S. 
cross-listing, since the coefficients of both ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t and U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 
are positive and significant for the young firms and firms with lower dividend yield. 
For the firms with higher age and firms with higher dividend yield, although they do 
not receive benefit from a U.S. cross-listing, they enjoy higher equity returns by 
cross-listing on LSE. A LSE cross-listing increases the equity returns of old firms by 
around 19% temporarily and 4% permanently. For firms with higher dividend yield, 
a LSE cross-listing increases the equity returns by around 4% permanently. This 
finding to some extent is consistent with the discoveries of Pagano, Röell and 
Zechner (2002) that firms cross-listed on the U.S. exchanges tend to be rapidly 
expanding high-tech and export-oriented companies with low leverage, while firms 
cross-listed on European exchanges tend to be large and newly privatized firms 
trying to expand foreign sales. The reason for the different characteristics of 
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cross-listed firms on U.S. exchanges and European exchanges may be that a 
cross-listing on U.S. exchanges and a cross-listing on European exchanges, such as 
LSE, benefit firms with different characteristics. 
4.7 Cross-listing on other regions 
It is also important to compare the effect of cross-listing on the U.S. exchanges, LSE 
and exchanges of other regions. Table 11 shows the regression results of the effects 
of U.S. cross-listing, number of institutional investors, and their interaction term on 
industrial adjusted returns, with LSE cross-listing variables and global cross-listing 
variables as additional control variables. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report the regression 
results of the whole sample, the common-law-sample and the non-common-law 
sample respectively. First, in all regressions of Table 11, the sign and significance of 
coefficients ofΔU.S. Cross-listi,t, U.S. Cross-listi,t-1, and U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of 
IOsi,t-1 are generally the same as previous tests. Second, the linear and interaction 
terms of LSE cross-listing are all insignificant. Third, the level and interaction terms 
of global cross-listing, Global Cross-listi,t-1 and Global Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 
are not significant, but the first difference of the global cross-listing variable, Δ
Global Cross-listi,t is positive and significant in the whole sample and the 
common-law sample. Although the coefficients ofΔGlobal Cross-listi,t is lower than 
the coefficients of ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t in both the whole sample and the common law 
sample, however, the p-value of the F-tests in the third bottom row of the respective 
columns of Table 11 show that the coefficients of ΔGlobal Cross-listi,t are not 
significantly different from the coefficients ofΔU.S. Cross-listi,t. Therefore, the 
temporary positive effects of U.S. cross-listing and global cross-listing on equity 
returns are similar for both the whole sample and the common law sample. 
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Nevertheless, only U.S. cross-listing has a permanent positive effect on the equity 
returns for the common law sample.     
Table 12 shows the results of the firm growth hypothesis with LSE cross-listing 
variables and global cross-listing variables as additional control variables. Columns 
1 and 2 report the firms with lower sample period mean age and higher sample 
period mean age respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the firms with lower sample 
period mean dividend yield and higher sample period mean dividend yield 
respectively. The linear and interaction terms of U.S. cross-listing variables and LSE 
cross-listing variables have similar sign and significance to pervious regression 
results. The first difference of global cross-listing, ΔGlobal Cross-listi,t is positive 
and significant in both the lower and higher age samples and the lower dividend 
yield sample. For both the lower age sample and lower dividend yield sample, the 
coefficients ofΔGlobal Cross-listi,t are lower than the coefficients of ΔU.S. 
Cross-listi,t, and for the higher age sample, the coefficient ofΔGlobal Cross-listi,t is 
lower than the coefficient ofΔLSE Cross-listi,t. However, the p-value of the F-tests 
in the third bottom row of the respective columns of Table 12 show that for the 
lower age sample and lower dividend yield sample, the coefficients ofΔGlobal 
Cross-listi,t are not significantly different from the coefficient of ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t, 
and for the higher age sample, the coefficient ofΔGlobal Cross-listi,t is not 
significantly different from the coefficient ofΔLSE Cross-listi,t. Therefore, although 
global cross-listing does not have a permanent effect on equity returns of young 
firms, old firms, and firms with lower dividend yield, global cross-listing has similar 
temporary positive effects to U.S. cross-listing on equity returns of young firms and 
firms with lower dividend yield and a similar temporary positive effect to LSE 
cross-listing on old firms. 
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This suggests that there is no information environment improvement for global 
cross-listing. Also, cross-listing on exchanges other than the U.S. exchanges and 
LSE does not have the permanent positive effect on the equity returns similar to 
those of U.S. cross-listing and LSE cross-listing. However, cross-listing on 
exchanges other than the U.S. exchanges and LSE benefits a wider range of firms 
with different characteristics by temporary positive effects on equity returns, and the 
magnitudes are not significantly different from the temporary positive effects of the 
U.S. exchanges and LSE. One possible explanation is the familiarity, i.e. “the 
geographical, economic, cultural, and industrial proximity”, suggested by Sarkissian 
and Schill (2004). Since in the global financial market, the firms are easier to select 
suitable exchanges to cross-list instead of constraining in cross-listing on one stock 
exchange, such as LSE, firms with different characteristics are more likely to be 
benefited from global cross-listing. 
4.8 The non-crisis period and crisis period 
The sample period of this study is from the first half of 2006 to the first half of 2011. 
There is a global financial crisis, the Financial Tsunami, during the sample period. 
Therefore, it is important to test the three hypotheses of cross-listing for the crisis 
period and non-crisis period separately. It is difficult to determine the starting and 
ending time of the Financial Tsunami. In this study, the starting time of the Financial 
Tsunami is the second half of 2008 when the Lehman Brothers bankrupted, and the 
ending time is the second half of 2009, since the U.S. President Barack Obama 
announced on January 27, 2010, “the markets are now stabilized, and we’ve 
recovered most of the money we spent on the banks. (United States Department of 
the Treasury Office of Finance Stability 2010)”  
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Columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 13 reports the regression results of U.S. cross-listing for 
the whole sample, the common-law sample and the non-common-law sample 
respectively during the non-crisis period with raw returns as the dependent variable. 
During the non-crisis period, the coefficient of the interaction term of the U.S. 
cross-listing variable, U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 is positive and significant at 
1% level for the whole sample and the common-law sample, but positive and 
significant at 10% level for the non-common-law sample. The coefficients of the 
linear terms of the U.S. cross-listing, ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t, and U.S. Cross-listi,t-1, are 
only positive and significant for the common-law sample. However, the variable Δ
U.S. Cross-listi,t, is negative and significant for the non-common-law sample. The 
reason may be some firms choose to cross-list on the U.S. exchanges when the 
performance is strongest as suggested by Ndubizu (2007). If the firms from 
non-common-law regions choose to cross-list when the performance of the firms is 
strongest, the performance of these firms will become worse after the U.S. 
cross-listing. Therefore, during the non-crisis period, the results support the 
information environment hypothesis, but not the legal bonding hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, there are differences between the crisis period and non-crisis period. 
Columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 13 report the regression results of U.S. cross-listing for 
the whole sample, the common-law sample and the non-common-law sample 
respectively during the crisis period with raw returns as the dependent variable. 
During the crisis period, the interaction term of the U.S. cross-listing variable, U.S. 
Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 is not significant for all three samples. Therefore, there 
is no information environment improvement during the crisis period. Moreover, the 
first difference of the U.S. cross-listing variable, ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t, is only positive 
and significant for the non-common-law sample. Therefore, only firms from 
50 
 
non-common-law regions receive a temporary increase in equity return when they 
initiate a U.S. cross-listing. This suggests that the legal bonding effect exists during 
the crisis period. 
Table 14 reports the regression results of split samples by sample period mean age 
and sample period mean dividend yield during the non-crisis period. Columns 1 and 
2 report the young firms and old firms respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the 
firms with lower dividend yield and higher dividend yield respectively. During the 
non-crisis period, the coefficient of the first difference and the lag level of the U.S. 
cross-listing, ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t, and U.S. Cross-listi,t-1, are positive and significant 
for the young firms, and the coefficient of the lag level of the U.S. cross-listing, U.S. 
Cross-listi,t-1, is positive and significant for the firms with lower dividend yield. 
These results are similar to the previous tests with the whole sample period and still 
support the firm growth hypothesis. However, column 2 of Table 14 shows that a 
U.S. cross-listing temporarily lowers the equity returns of old firms by around 47% 
during the non-crisis period. One possible reason is that the cross-listing firms seize 
the timing of the U.S. cross-listing as suggested by Ndubizu (2007).   
Table 15 reports the regression results of split samples by sample period mean age 
and sample period mean dividend yield during the crisis period. Columns 1 and 2 
report the young firms and old firms respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the firms 
with lower dividend yield and higher dividend yield respectively. Columns 1 and 2 
show that both the equity returns of firms with lower and higher age do not increase 
during and after a U.S. cross-listing. Nevertheless, columns 3 and 4 show that during 
the crisis period, both the firms with lower and higher dividend yield receive benefit 
from a U.S. cross-listing. A U.S. cross-listing increases the equity returns of firms 
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with lower dividend yield by around 7.1% permanently and increases the equity 
return of firms with higher dividend yield by around 21% temporarily. A possible 
explanation is that during the crisis period, even firms with higher dividend yield 
need external capital to maintain an effective operation. After improving the source 
of external capital, firms with higher dividend yield, which usually do not have 
financial stress in the long run, can operate smoothly, so the increase in equity return 
is once. Firms with lower dividend yield, which usually have financial stress in the 
long run, need time to show whether the firm can solve the financial stress in the 
long run even after improving the source of external capital by cross-listing on the 
U.S. exchanges, so the increase in equity returns last for many periods. 
During the non-crisis period, the information environment improvement and firm 
growth effect exist, but there is no legal bonding effect. During the crisis period 
when the financial market is not stable, nevertheless, the information environment 
improvement effect does not exist, and the firm growth effect is not strong. However, 
during the crisis period, results show support for legal bonding hypothesis. The 
reason may be that the U.S. cross-listing only has legal bonding effect on serious 
corporate governance problems. As suggested by Johnson et al (2000), the corporate 
governance problem becomes serious during the crisis period. Therefore, the legal 
bonding effect only exists during crisis period, but not non-crisis period.  
This chapter described the detailed analyses of the empirical findings. In the next 
chapter, a short conclusion is present.  
 
 
52 
 
Chapter 5 Conclusion 
This chapter gives a short conclusion of the empirical findings of the Chapter 4. 
First, for the information environment improvement hypothesis, most of the 
previous studies test the hypothesis indirectly. For example, Lang, Raedy and 
Yetman(2003) shows that the U.S. cross-listed firms engage in less earning 
smoothing and the correlation between their accounting data and their equity returns 
is stronger. Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) shows that the equity price of U.S. 
cross-listed firms contains more firm specific information. These studies only point 
out that cross-listing lead to more information flow into the market. However, this 
information may not be useful for investment decision. If the extra information is 
not useful for the institutional investors to enhance profit, the extra information just 
produces more noise. This thesis directly asks the question whether a U.S. 
cross-listing improves the information environment by increasing the equity returns 
predictability of institutional investors. The answer is positive. The effect of U.S. 
cross-listing on information environment and equity returns predictability is strong 
regardless whether the returns are raw returns or industrial adjusted returns. These 
results do not only consist with the literatures supporting the information 
improvement hypothesis, but also some literatures questioning the information 
improvement hypothesis. For example, Lang, Raedy and Wilson (2006) suggest that 
the SEC does not enhance the disclosure standard of the U.S. cross-listed firm fully. 
The statistics results of this thesis show that, even we add up the coefficients of the 
linear term of the changes in number of institutional investors and the interaction 
term between U.S. cross-listing and changes in number of institutional investors, the 
predictability on equity returns of U.S. cross-listed firms from non-common-law 
regions is still lower than those from common-law regions. However, the important 
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implication is that the U.S. cross-listing effect on predictability is larger for firms 
from non-common-law regions. One possible reason is that the difference in 
information environment between the United States and non-common-law regions is 
larger. 
When the sample period is divided into non-crisis period and crisis period, the 
information environment improvement effect of U.S. cross-listing exists during the 
non-crisis period when the financial market is stable, but does not exist during the 
crisis period when the financial market is volatile. Therefore, the information 
environment improvement of U.S. cross-listing is only effective in the stable period. 
Second, results show that although the legal bonding effect of U.S. cross-listing does 
not exist in the whole sample period and non-crisis period, the legal bonding effect 
of U.S. cross-listing exists in the crisis period, i.e. from the second half of 2008 to 
the second half of 2009. A U.S. cross-listing only improves the equity returns of 
firms from common-law regions during the whole sample period and non-crisis 
period. However, during the crisis period, a U.S. cross-listing only improves the 
equity returns of firms from non-common-law regions. This finding partially 
consists with the view of La Porta et al (2000) , Licht (2003) and Siegel (2005) that 
the legal bonding effect of U.S. cross-listing is not fully effective. The legal bonding 
effect of U.S. cross-listing exists only in the crisis period when the corporate 
governance problem becomes serious.  
The third important finding is that only young firms and firms with lower dividend 
yield benefit from the U.S. cross-listing, this is reflected by the increase in equity 
returns of these firms during and after a U.S. cross-listing. Firms with these two 
characteristics are more likely to face financial distress. A U.S. cross-listing provides 
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more opportunities and lower capital cost for these firms to raise external capital. 
This may be one of the most important motivations and impacts of a U.S. 
cross-listing. When the sample period is divided into non-crisis period and crisis 
period, the firm growth effect of U.S. cross-listing exists during the non-crisis period 
when the financial market is stable, but the firm growth effect becomes weaker 
during the crisis period when the financial market is volatile.  
Fourth, this thesis discovers that while cross-listing on U.S. exchanges increases the 
equity returns of young firms and firms with lower dividends yield, cross-listing on 
LSE has the similar effects, but on old firms and firms with higher dividend yield. 
This suggests that U.S. cross-listing and LSE cross-listing provide benefit to firms 
with different characteristics. Some studies have a similar view. For example, as 
pointed out by Coffee (1999), different stock exchanges have different functions. 
Therefore, firms with different goals may choose to list on different stock exchanges 
and subject to different corporate governance standards. Moreover, empirical results 
of Pagano, Röell and Zechner (2002) show that firms cross-listed on the U.S. 
exchanges tend to be rapidly expanding high-tech and export-oriented companies 
with low leverage, while firms cross-listed on European exchanges tend to be large 
and newly privatized firms trying to expand foreign sales. 
Moreover, the empirical results of this thesis find out that cross-listing on exchanges 
other than the U.S. exchanges and LSE does not improve the information 
environment. However, cross-listing on exchanges other than the U.S. exchanges 
and LSE benefits a wider range of firms, including firms with lower and higher age 
and firms with lower dividend yield. The reason may be that the firms can select 
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suitable cross-listing exchanges from the global market, rather than constraint to 
cross-list on one particular exchange. 
Nevertheless, this thesis may not completely solve the self-selection problem of the 
U.S. cross-listing decision. Since the dependent variable of this study is the equity 
returns, and as pointed out by Siegel (2005), “Most, if not all, instruments that one 
could list are invalid because they also have a direct effect on later firm 
performance.”, instead of using instrument variables to estimate 
two-stage-least-squares regressions, the robustness tests of this thesis include 
additional control variables which affect the cross-listing decision in order to 
minimize the self-selection problem of the U.S. cross-listing. 
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Table A 
Definition of variables 
Variable name Variable definitions 
Dependent variables  
Raw Returnsi,t (USD Equity price of firm i in period t -USD Equity 
price of firm i in period t-1) / USD Equity price of firm i 
in the period t-1. 
Industrial Adjusted 
Returnsi,t 
Raw returns of firm i net of the returns of an equally 
weighted portfolio containing firms in the same industry 
according to the Fama-French 48 industry sectors. 
Key independent variables  
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 If the firm i has cross-listing on the NYSE, NASDAQ or 
Amex in the previous period, U.S. Cross-listi,t-1equals to 
one. Otherwise, U.S. Cross-listi,t-1equals to zero. 
∆U.S. Cross-listi,t If the firm i starts a cross-listed in the current period, 
∆U.S. Cross-listi,t equals to one. Otherwise, ∆U.S. 
Cross-listi,t equals to zero. 
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 Changes in number of institutional investors of firm i in 
the previous period. 
No. of IOsi,t-2 Number of institutional investors of firm i in the second 
previous period. 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of 
IOsI,t-1 
The interaction term of U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 and∆No. of 
IOsI,t-1. 
  
Control variables  
Raw returnsi,t Raw equity returns of firm i in the previous period. 
Raw returnsi,t-2 Raw equity returns of firm i in the second previous 
period. 
BTVi,t-1 The book to market ratio of firm i in the previous period. 
Log MKCi,t-1 The natural logarithm of market capitalization in 
thousands of U.S. dollar of firm i in the previous period. 
Turnoveri,t-1 The ratio of total turnover to total shares outstanding of 
firm i in the previous period. 
Log pricei,t-1 The natural logarithm of the equity price in U.S. dollar 
of firm i in the previous period. 
Agei,t-1 The number of months since the first price observation 
of firm i appeared in Compustat in the previous period. 
DVYi,t-1 The dividend yield of firm i in the previous period. 
S&Pi,t-1 S&Pi,t-1 equals to one if the firm i was included in either 
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or both of S&P Global 1200 Index or S&P/TSX 
Composite Index in the previous period. Otherwise, 
S&Pi,t-1 equals to zero. 
VRi,t-1 The variance of monthly returns of firm i of the twenty 
months before the previous period. 
Additional control 
variables 
 
Sales growthi,t-1 The semi-annual sales growth rate of firm i in the 
previous period 
Leveragei,t-1 Total liabilities of firm i divided by total assets of firm i 
in the previous period. 
Proportion of foreign 
salesi,t-1 
The ratio of the foreign sales to total sales of firm i in the 
previous period. 
Log Total assetsi,t-1 The natural logarithm of the total assets in thousands of 
USD of firm i in the previous period. 
ROAi,t-1 The return on assets in percentage of firm i at the 
previous period. 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1 If the firm i has cross-listing on the LSE in the previous 
period, LSE Cross-listi,t-1 equals to one. Otherwise, LSE 
Cross-listi,t-1 equals to zero. 
∆LSE Cross-listi,t If the firm i starts or stops a LSE cross-listing in the 
current period, ∆LSE Cross-list equals to one or negative 
one respectively. Otherwise, ∆LSE Cross-list equals to 
zero. 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of 
IOsi,t-1 
The interaction term of LSE Cross-listi,t-1 and ∆No. of 
IOsi,t-1 
Global Cross-listi,t-1 If the firm i has listing on exchanges of at least two 
countries/regions other than the U.S. exchanges and LSE 
in the previous period, Global Cross-listi,t-1 equals to 
one. Otherwise, Global Cross-listi,t-1 equals to zero. 
∆Global Cross-listi,t The first difference of Global Cross-listi,t in the current 
period. 
Global Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. 
of IOsi,t-1 
The interaction term of Global Cross-listi,t-1 and ∆No. of 
IOsi,t-1 
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Table 1  
Number of cross-listed on the U.S. exchanges, LSE, and non-cross-listed firms 
Country 
Firms without 
cross-listing in the 
sample period 
Firms with U.S. 
cross-listing in the 
sample period 
Firms with a LSE 
cross-listing in the 
sample period 
Firms with 
cross-listing on 
exchanges other 
than the U.S. 
exchanges and 
LSE in the sample 
period 
Total 
Austria 63 0 0 8 71 
Austrialia 1,407 8 39 68 1,517 
Belgium 110 2 1 10 122 
Canada 1,987 144 17 1 2,147 
Swizerland 170 5 2 16 188 
Germany 673 6 8 9 692 
Denmark 116 1 0 5 122 
Spain 102 2 3 17 119 
Finland 99 1 2 8 109 
France 622 8 3 32 660 
United Kingdom 1,427 24 0 80 1,521 
Greece 240 1 4 1 244 
Hong Kong 162 4 2 11 177 
Ireland 4 4 43 0 49 
Italy 201 4 1 10 215 
Japan 3,305 9 8 13 3,329 
Luxemburg 14 3 5 9 27 
Netherland 83 4 4 16 105 
Norway 119 1 1 4 124 
New Zealand 93 4 1 14 108 
Portugal 39 1 0 3 42 
Sweden 310 2 0 11 323 
Singapore 504 0 3 14 521 
Total 11,850 238 147 360 12,532 
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Table 2a  
Summary statistics of the whole sample. Table A shows the definition of the variables. 
Variables N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
Dependent Variables 
      
Raw returnsi,t 116563 0.061092 0.479536 -0.19677 0.001206 0.211728 
Industrial adjusted returnsi,t 116563 -0.0175 0.406736 -0.23251 -0.05965 0.122163 
Key Independent Variables 
      
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 116563 1.139864 5.793875 0 0 1 
No. of IOsi,t-2 116563 9.970428 16.60431 0 3 12 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 116563 0.019432 0.138037 0 0 0 
∆U.S. Cross-listi,t 116563 0.000292 0.017077 0 0 0 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsI,t-1 116563 0.094764 2.041082 0 0 0 
Control Variables 
      
Pricei,t-1 116563 47.72951 207.5762 0.578722 3.29033 11.5725 
Pricei,t-2 116563 49.66559 215.4164 0.607745 3.377907 11.72546 
Age
 i,t-1 116563 229.7714 101.7314 130 281 305 
BTV
 i,t-1 116563 1.027209 0.951609 0.397938 0.775386 1.326852 
DVY
 i,t-1 116563 0.01031 0.021527 0 0 0.012387 
Turnover
 i,t-1 116563 0.050133 0.072289 0.00748 0.023516 0.062268 
VR
 i,t-1 116563 0.036994 0.060664 0.006679 0.015597 0.039479 
MKC
 i,t-1 116563 892024.6 2936685 20474.15 77303.23 357595.2 
Additional Control Variables 
      
Sales growth
 i,t-1 116563 0.046966 0.414588 0 0 0.016925 
Leverage
 i,t-1 88796 0.476477 0.259403 0.28323 0.488528 0.651356 
Proportion of foreign sales
 i,t-1 116563 0.167988 0.3249 0 0 0.134701 
Total assets
 i,t-1 116509 1414993 4638484 29835 141992 608849 
ROA
 i,t-1 112449 -1.19971 18.48483 -4.77 2.94 7.91 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1 116563 0.009368 0.096336 0 0 0 
∆LSE Cross-listi,t 116563 9.44E-05 0.019648 0 0 0 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsi,t-1 116563 0.021388 0.88584 0 0 0 
Global Cross-listi,t-1 116563 0.019783 0.139256 0 0 0 
∆Global Cross-listi,t 116563 0.000841 0.03818 0 0 0 
Global Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsi,t-1 116563 0.052435 1.594028 0 0 0 
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Table 2b 
Summary statistics of firms without cross-listing during the sample period. Table A shows the 
definition of the variables. 
Variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
Dependent Variables 
      
Raw returnsi,t 110019 0.058251 0.477505 -0.19745 -0.0014 0.207081 
Industrial adjusted returnsi,t 110019 -0.01815 0.406387 -0.23296 -0.06074 0.120938 
Key Independent Variables 
      
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 110019 1.016515 5.304493 0 0 1 
No. of IOsi,t-2 110019 9.091166 15.13061 0 3 11 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 110019 0 0 0 0 0 
∆U.S. Cross-listi,t 110019 0 0 0 0 0 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsI,t-1 110019 0 0 0 0 0 
Control Variables 
      
Pricei,t-1 110019 48.68996 210.1356 0.562187 3.203489 11.12925 
Pricei,t-2 110019 50.7584 218.3263 0.590034 3.303817 11.29395 
Age
 i,t-1 110019 230.8201 101.4566 134 281 305 
BTV
 i,t-1 110019 1.045691 0.958527 0.409674 0.796504 1.351426 
DVY
 i,t-1 110019 0.010358 0.021636 0 0 0.012427 
Turnover
 i,t-1 110019 0.048567 0.071542 0.007148 0.022334 0.059175 
VR
 i,t-1 110019 0.037115 0.06102 0.006662 0.015493 0.039412 
MKC
 i,t-1 110019 678831.4 2273815 19353.94 71110.26 312969.1 
Additional Control Variables 
      
Sales growth
 i,t-1 110019 0.043458 0.402687 0 0 0.005103 
Leverage
 i,t-1 82735 0.480053 0.258766 0.288897 0.491338 0.653034 
Proportion of foreign sales
 i,t-1 110019 0.158696 0.315769 0 0 0.108075 
Total assets
 i,t-1 109967 1121573 3736357 28599 134413 552559 
ROA
 i,t-1 106075 -1.22269 18.46949 -4.66 2.93 7.85 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1 110019 0 0 0 0 0 
∆LSE Cross-listi,t 110019 0 0 0 0 0 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsi,t-1 110019 0 0 0 0 0 
Global Cross-listi,t-1 110019 0 0 0 0 0 
∆Global Cross-listi,t 110019 0 0 0 0 0 
Global Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsi,t-1 110019 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 2c 
Summary statistics of firms with cross-listing on the U.S. exchanges during the sample period. Table 
A shows the definition of the variables. 
Variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
Dependent Variables 
      
Raw returnsi,t 2483 0.114439 0.461622 -0.14084 0.070018 0.273822 
Industrial adjusted returnsi,t 2483 -0.00902 0.388136 -0.20975 -0.0329 0.145064 
Key Independent Variables 
      
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 2483 4.65888 13.39071 0 1 6 
No. of IOsi,t-2 2483 31.69392 34.07579 3 16 55 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 2483 0.912203 0.283057 1 1 1 
∆U.S. Cross-listi,t 2483 0.013693 0.116237 0 0 0 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsI,t-1 2483 4.448651 13.27673 0 1 5 
Control Variables 
      
Pricei,t-1 2483 37.96607 174.0679 3.449734 10.62416 26.05506 
Pricei,t-2 2483 37.33478 173.6229 3.276782 10.28024 24.54398 
Age
 i,t-1 2483 216.6589 88.20172 134 263 293 
BTV
 i,t-1 2483 0.564182 0.527245 0.249253 0.43115 0.713606 
DVY
 i,t-1 2483 0.009781 0.018697 0 0 0.013487 
Turnover
 i,t-1 2483 0.082578 0.075235 0.031006 0.063317 0.107946 
VR
 i,t-1 2483 0.027495 0.043143 0.005991 0.01428 0.032254 
MKC
 i,t-1 2483 6428892 8211339 224625.4 1778528 1.08E+07 
Additional Control Variables 
      
Sales growth
 i,t-1 2299 0.101785 0.454682 -0.03585 0.017954 0.177372 
Leverage
 i,t-1 2228 0.415356 0.239996 0.225335 0.42502 0.580937 
Proportion of foreign sales
 i,t-1 2299 0.340077 0.413785 0 0 0.774495 
Total assets
 i,t-1 2483 8216153 12054374 145862 1534681 12303000 
ROA
 i,t-1 2269 2.48825 16.61383 -2.77 5.57 10.77 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1 2483 0.11078 0.485058 -0.03343 0.011934 0.176873 
∆LSE Cross-listi,t 2401 0.403568 0.244688 0.204987 0.405593 0.574585 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsi,t-1 2483 0.331444 0.413094 0 0 0.768397 
Global Cross-listi,t-1 2483 8216153 1.21E+07 145862 1534681 1.23E+07 
∆Global Cross-listi,t 2448 1.5396 17.59311 -4.255 4.9 10.69 
Global Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsi,t-1 2483 0.11078 0.485058 -0.03343 0.011934 0.176873 
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Table 2d  
Summary statistics of firms with cross-listing on LSE during the sample period. Table A shows the 
definition of the variables. 
Variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
Dependent Variables 
      
Raw returnsi,t 1353 0.10991 0.556594 -0.21867 0.050118 0.31344 
Industrial adjusted returnsi,t 1353 -0.01746 0.443147 -0.2625 -0.04551 0.138908 
Key Independent Variables 
      
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 1353 2.13969 8.429599 -1 0 3 
No. of IOsi,t-2 1353 18.81227 22.82705 2 10 28 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 1353 0.105691 0.307556 0 0 0 
∆U.S. Cross-listi,t 1353 0 0 0 0 0 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsI,t-1 1353 0.521803 4.911465 0 0 0 
Control Variables 
      
Pricei,t-1 1353 23.81744 139.8494 0.309605 1.95214 10.11414 
Pricei,t-2 1353 23.33747 138.6742 0.323867 2.161466 10.24184 
Age
 i,t-1 1353 188.4974 116.5644 64 263 299 
BTV
 i,t-1 1353 0.835828 0.951716 0.320453 0.535779 0.931299 
DVY
 i,t-1 1353 0.00791 0.018197 0 0 0.007663 
Turnover
 i,t-1 1353 0.062912 0.072736 0.012128 0.039634 0.090075 
VR
 i,t-1 1353 0.042092 0.054663 0.008726 0.024009 0.054267 
MKC
 i,t-1 1353 3664181 6832954 39235.5 211637.1 2967416 
Additional Control Variables 
      
Sales growth
 i,t-1 1353 0.105754 0.643091 -0.07581 0 0.164496 
Leverage
 i,t-1 1268 0.411025 0.277638 0.14552 0.418668 0.624288 
Proportion of foreign sales
 i,t-1 1353 0.419725 0.449895 0 0.174901 1 
Total assets
 i,t-1 1351 5771457 11056068 29847 204295 3665580 
ROA
 i,t-1 1303 -3.5404 20.467 -10.06 1.31 7.72 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1 1353 0.807095 0.394725 1 1 1 
∆LSE Cross-listi,t 1353 0.00813 0.182258 0 0 0 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsi,t-1 1353 1.842572 8.018445 0 0 3 
Global Cross-listi,t-1 1353 0.070953 0.256842 0 0 0 
∆Global Cross-listi,t 1353 0.004435 0.085888 0 0 0 
Global Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsi,t-1 1353 0.224686 3.440932 0 0 0 
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Table 2e 
Summary statistics of firms with cross-listing on exchanges other than the U.S. exchanges and LSE 
during the sample period. Table A shows the definition of the variables. 
Variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
Dependent Variables 
      
Raw returnsi,t 3366 0.096283 0.497831 -0.19418 0.042608 0.279134 
Industrial adjusted returnsi,t 3366 0.00037 0.397212 -0.21464 -0.03483 0.1363 
Key Independent Variables 
      
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 3366 2.98574 10.93185 -1 1 5 
No. of IOsi,t-2 3366 25.34195 28.83674 3 13 40 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 3366 0.113785 0.317597 0 0 0 
∆U.S. Cross-listi,t 3366 0.000297 0.017236 0 0 0 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsI,t-1 3366 0.703506 6.173184 0 0 0 
Control Variables 
      
Pricei,t-1 3366 40.36555 182.2764 0.767853 4.790886 23.47498 
Pricei,t-2 3366 40.2069 182.2322 0.768639 4.822763 23.24881  
Age
 i,t-1 3366 229.5799 105.6649 119 281 305 
BTV
 i,t-1 3366 0.771003 0.80653 0.297969 0.53062 0.964567 
DVY
 i,t-1 3366 0.011277 0.021242 0 0 0.01595 
Turnover
 i,t-1 3366 0.0834 0.086668 0.021912 0.05945 0.114809 
VR
 i,t-1 3366 0.033444 0.057199 0.006137 0.014814 0.036104 
MKC
 i,t-1 3366 5132924 7901349 91141.05 652312.3 6428457 
Additional Control Variables 
      
Sales growth
 i,t-1 3366 0.09447 0.584159 -0.06484 0 0.150774 
Leverage
 i,t-1 3018 0.471058 0.259475 0.261446 0.502954 0.665169 
Proportion of foreign sales
 i,t-1 3366 0.300245 0.416193 0 0 0.721981 
Total assets
 i,t-1 3366 7773515 12282843 95683 807433 9966112 
ROA
 i,t-1 3280 0.121439 17.89697 -3.43 3.94 9.165 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1 3366 0.046643 0.210904 0 0 0 
∆LSE Cross-listi,t 3366 0.000891 0.038537 0 0 0 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsi,t-1 3366 0.173203 2.828638 0 0 0 
Global Cross-listi,t-1 3366 0.685086 0.464551 0 1 1 
∆Global Cross-listi,t 3366 0.029115 0.222873 0 0 0 
Global Cross-listi,t-1*∆No. of IOsi,t-1 3366 1.815805 9.209431 0 0 2 
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Table 2f 
Time series of number of firms cross-listed on different exchanges.  
 
Number of firms 
cross-listed on 
the U.S. 
exchanges 
Number of firms 
cross-listed on 
London Stock 
Exchanges 
Number of firms 
had at least listed 
on exchanges of 
two countries 
other than the 
U.S. exchanges 
and London 
Stock Exchange 
Total number of 
firms 
2005 2nd half 175 67 130 8,238 
2006 1st half 183 78 146 8,863 
2006 2nd half 196 87 160 9,326 
2007 1st half 199 92 172 10,074 
2007 2nd half 206 98 178 10,534 
2008 1st half 210 106 206 10,915 
2008 2nd half 214 109 227 11,301 
2009 1st half 215 110 251 11,526 
2009 2nd half 219 111 269 11,739 
2010 1st half 220 115 275 11,955 
2010 2nd half 228 119 292 12,092 
2011 1st half 231 121 302 12,092 
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Table 2g 
Summary statistics of the time series of the U.S. cross-listing dummy, LSE cross-listing dummy and 
global cross-listing dummy in each period. 
U.S. cross-listing dummy (Number of N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
2005 2nd half 8238 0.021243 0.144202 0 0 0 
2006 1st half 8863 0.020648 0.14221 0 0 0 
2006 2nd half 9326 0.021017 0.143447 0 0 0 
2007 1st half 10074 0.019754 0.13916 0 0 0 
2007 2nd half 10534 0.019556 0.138474 0 0 0 
2008 1st half 10915 0.01924 0.137372 0 0 0 
2008 2nd half 11301 0.018936 0.136306 0 0 0 
2009 1st half 11526 0.018654 0.135304 0 0 0 
2009 2nd half 11739 0.018656 0.135312 0 0 0 
2010 1st half 11955 0.018402 0.134407 0 0 0 
2010 2nd half 12092 0.018855 0.13602 0 0 0 
2011 1st half 12092 0.019104 0.136895 0 0 0 
LSE cross-listing dummy N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
2005 2nd half 8238 0.008133 0.089821 0 0 0 
2006 1st half 8863 0.008801 0.093403 0 0 0 
2006 2nd half 9326 0.009329 0.096139 0 0 0 
2007 1st half 10074 0.009132 0.095131 0 0 0 
2007 2nd half 10534 0.009303 0.096008 0 0 0 
2008 1st half 10915 0.009711 0.098071 0 0 0 
2008 2nd half 11301 0.009645 0.097739 0 0 0 
2009 1st half 11526 0.009544 0.097229 0 0 0 
2009 2nd half 11739 0.009456 0.096784 0 0 0 
2010 1st half 11955 0.009619 0.09761 0 0 0 
2010 2nd half 12092 0.009841 0.098718 0 0 0 
2011 1st half 12092 0.010007 0.099535 0 0 0 
Global cross-listing dummy N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
2005 2nd half 8238 0.015781 0.124633 0 0 0 
2006 1st half 8863 0.016473 0.127293 0 0 0 
2006 2nd half 9326 0.017156 0.129861 0 0 0 
2007 1st half 10074 0.017074 0.129552 0 0 0 
2007 2nd half 10534 0.016898 0.128894 0 0 0 
2008 1st half 10915 0.018873 0.136083 0 0 0 
2008 2nd half 11301 0.020087 0.140303 0 0 0 
2009 1st half 11526 0.021777 0.145961 0 0 0 
2009 2nd half 11739 0.022915 0.149639 0 0 0 
2010 1st half 11955 0.023003 0.149919 0 0 0 
2010 2nd half 12092 0.024148 0.153516 0 0 0 
2011 1st half 12092 0.024975 0.156056 0 0 0 
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Table 3 
The effect of U.S. cross-listing and institutional ownership level on raw returns. 
This table presents the ordinary least squares regression results on the effects of U.S. cross-listing and 
institutional ownership level on raw returns. The dependent variable is Raw returnsi,t, which is the 
USD semi-annual raw equity returns. Table A shows the definition of the independent variables. All 
the regressions include the Fama-French 48 industrial dummies, country dummies and semi-annual 
time dummies. t-statistics according to firm cluster robust standard error are in the parenthesis. 
Significance level notations are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
  Law origin   Law origin  
 (Whole 
sample) 
(Common-law) (Non-common- 
law) 
(Whole 
sample) 
(Common-law) (Non-common- 
law) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Raw returns
 
Raw returns Raw returns Raw returns Raw returns Raw returns 
∆U.S. Cross-listi,t    0.179* 0.223** -0.0995 
    (1.76) (2.22) (-0.34) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1    0.0176** 0.0319*** -0.00135 
    (1.96) (2.90) (-0.09) 
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 0.000349* 0.00143*** 0.000246 0.000115 0.00110*** 0.000101 
 (1.73) (5.41) (0.80) (0.53) (3.88) (0.32) 
No. of IOsi,t-2 0.00133*** 0.00158*** 0.000371*** 0.00131*** 0.00153*** 0.000371*** 
 (13.26) (11.30) (2.90) (12.93) (10.80) (2.91) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1* 
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 
   0.00167*** 0.00172*** 0.00210** 
   (3.19) (2.83) (2.45) 
Raw returnsi,t-1 -0.0110*** -0.00893* 0.0170*** -0.0110*** -0.00895* 0.0170*** 
 (-2.75) (-1.69) (3.17) (-2.77) (-1.69) (3.18) 
Raw returnsi,t-2 0.0113*** 0.0323*** 0.00258 0.0113*** 0.0324*** 0.00266 
 (3.00) (6.22) (0.52) (3.01) (6.23) (0.53) 
Log pricei,t-1 -0.0170*** -0.0416*** -0.00533*** -0.0171*** -0.0415*** -0.00532*** 
 (-17.60) (-18.08) (-5.85) (-17.68) (-18.06) (-5.84) 
S&P
 i,t-1 0.0357*** 0.0359*** 0.0257*** 0.0321*** 0.0289*** 0.0248*** 
 (7.45) (4.42) (5.09) (6.60) (3.52) (4.73) 
Age
 i,t-1 0.000109*** 0.0000883*** 0.000171*** 0.000108*** 0.0000868*** 0.000170*** 
 (5.43) (3.11) (6.65) (5.37) (3.05) (6.63) 
VR
 i,t-1 0.0852** -0.0698 0.0505 0.0866** -0.0687 0.0501 
 (2.31) (-1.60) (0.81) (2.34) (-1.58) (0.80) 
BTV
 i,t-1 0.0632*** 0.0660*** 0.0507*** 0.0631*** 0.0659*** 0.0507*** 
 (26.89) (18.31) (19.42) (26.84) (18.28) (19.42) 
Log MKC
 i,t-1 -0.00721*** 0.00262 -0.00126 -0.00727*** 0.00208 -0.00120 
 (-6.61) (1.25) (-1.09) (-6.65) (0.98) (-1.05) 
Turnover
 i,t-1 -0.0956*** -0.128*** -0.0721*** -0.0939*** -0.124*** -0.0719*** 
 (-4.30) (-3.16) (-3.06) (-4.21) (-3.05) (-3.05) 
DVY
 i,t-1 0.333*** -0.0724 0.626*** 0.338*** -0.0567 0.626*** 
 (5.60) (-0.66) (9.60) (5.67) (-0.52) (9.60) 
Adjusted R2 0.258 0.325 0.205 0.258 0.325 0.205 
N 116563 53779 62784 116563 53779 62784 
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Table 4 
The effect of U.S. cross-listing and institutional ownership level on raw returns, sub-sample analyses: 
Firm age and dividend yield. 
This table presents the ordinary least squares regression results on the effects of U.S. cross-listing and 
institutional ownership level on raw returns with split samples. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of 
sub-sample with sample period mean age lower and higher than the sample period median 
respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of sub-sample with sample period mean dividend 
yield lower and higher than the sample period median respectively. The dependent variable is Raw 
returnsi,t, which is the USD semi-annual raw equity returns. Table A shows the definition of the 
independent variables. All the regressions include the Fama-French 48 industrial dummies, country 
dummies and semi-annual time dummies. t-statistics according to firm cluster robust standard error 
are in the parenthesis. Significance level notations are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 Firm age Dividend yield 
 (Low) (High) (Low) (High) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Raw returns
 
Raw returns Raw returns Raw returns 
ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t 0.260** -0.109 0.224* 0.121 
 (2.53) (-0.56) (1.82) (1.03) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 0.0570*** -0.000641 0.0496*** -0.00542 
 (3.89) (-0.06) (3.23) (-0.67) 
ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 0.00134* -0.00119*** 0.00115** -0.00143*** 
 (1.82) (-6.05) (2.41) (-7.16) 
No. of IOsi,t-2 0.00262*** 0.000530*** 0.00245*** 0.000311*** 
 (9.15) (5.56) (11.15) (3.24) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*Δ 
No. of IOsi,t-1 
0.00256** 0.00198*** 0.00236** 0.00192*** 
(2.27) (3.92) (1.99) (4.19) 
Raw returnsi,t-1 -0.00945 0.0305*** -0.00651 0.0304*** 
 (-1.61) (6.29) (-1.31) (5.52) 
Raw returnsi,t-2 0.0319*** -0.000538 0.0288*** -0.0164*** 
 (5.53) (-0.12) (5.98) (-3.36) 
Log pricei,t-1 -0.0406*** -0.00819*** -0.0246*** -0.00679*** 
 (-15.54) (-8.77) (-16.80) (-6.13) 
S&P
 i,t-1 0.0706*** 0.0171*** 0.0625*** -0.000144 
 (5.50) (3.73) (5.99) (-0.03) 
Age
 i,t-1 -0.000135*** -0.000631*** 0.0000927*** 0.0000336 
 (-2.98) (-7.05) (3.60) (0.60) 
VR
 i,t-1 -0.0458 -0.0300 0.0333 0.0703 
 (-1.01) (-0.49) (0.81) (0.87) 
BTV
 i,t-1 0.0750*** 0.0538*** 0.0723*** 0.0528*** 
 (17.26) (22.17) (21.00) (18.29) 
Log MKC
 i,t-1 -0.0114*** -0.00124 -0.0174*** 0.00136 
 (-4.17) (-1.15) (-9.58) (1.17) 
Turnover
 i,t-1 -0.172*** -0.0438* -0.177*** 0.0442 
 (-3.66) (-1.93) (-5.60) (1.54) 
DVY
 i,t-1 0.290 0.424*** 0.369 0.452*** 
 (1.22) (6.86) (1.14) (7.11) 
Adjusted R2 0.309 0.252 0.272 0.286 
N 38350 78213 58277 58286 
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Table 5 
The effect of U.S. cross-listing and institutional ownership level on raw returns of firms from 
different legal origin regions, sub-sample analyses: Firm age. 
This table presents the ordinary least squares regression results on the effects of U.S. cross-listing and 
institutional ownership level on raw returns with split samples. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of 
common-law firm sample with sample period mean age lower and higher than the sample period 
median respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of non-common-law firms sample with 
sample period mean age lower and higher than the sample period median respectively. The dependent 
variable is Raw returnsi,t, which is the USD semi-annual raw equity returns. Table A shows the 
definition of the independent variables. All the regressions include the Fama-French 48 industrial 
dummies, country dummies and semi-annual time dummies. t-statistics according to firm cluster 
robust standard error are in the parenthesis. Significance level notations are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01. 
 Law origin 
 (Common-law) (Non-common-law) 
 Firm age Firm age 
 (Low) (High) (Low) (High) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Raw returns
 
Raw returns Raw returns Raw returns 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 0.0536*** 0.0141 0.113* -0.0117 
 (3.52) (0.99) (1.76) (-0.77) 
ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 0.00149** 0.000426 0.00116 -0.000317 
 (1.96) (1.53) (0.46) (-1.10) 
No. of IOsi,t-2 0.00252*** 0.00118*** 0.00191** 0.0000967 
 (8.21) (7.92) (2.41) (0.78) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*Δ 
No. of IOsi,t-1 
0.00258** 0.00174*** -0.00430 0.00229*** 
(2.28) (3.08) (-0.67) (2.72) 
Raw returnsi,t-1 -0.0115* 0.0365*** 0.0330** 0.0153*** 
 (-1.79) (4.00) (2.22) (2.74) 
Raw returnsi,t-2 0.0316*** 0.0378*** 0.00355 0.00638 
 (4.98) (4.53) (0.26) (1.23) 
Log pricei,t-1 -0.0509*** -0.0248*** -0.0218*** -0.00486*** 
 (-15.64) (-8.32) (-5.95) (-5.18) 
S&P
 i,t-1 0.0673*** -0.00471 -0.167* 0.0202*** 
 (4.94) (-0.52) (-1.83) (3.91) 
Age
 i,t-1 -0.000108** -0.00254*** -0.000153 0.000221** 
 (-2.17) (-13.93) (-1.50) (2.21) 
VR
 i,t-1 -0.0927* -0.150 0.0342 0.00274 
 (-1.90) (-1.57) (0.31) (0.04) 
BTV
 i,t-1 0.0727*** 0.0520*** 0.0706*** 0.0496*** 
 (15.19) (10.46) (7.62) (18.73) 
Log MKC
 i,t-1 -0.00466 0.00253 -0.0114** 0.00102 
 (-1.45) (0.99) (-2.09) (0.87) 
Turnover
 i,t-1 -0.0849 -0.200*** -0.312*** -0.0332 
 (-1.45) (-3.96) (-4.54) (-1.35) 
DVY
 i,t-1 0.190 0.0168 2.410*** 0.583*** 
 (0.77) (0.14) (2.72) (8.88) 
Adjusted R2 0.328 0.371 0.227 0.210 
N 31726 22053 6624 56160 
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Table 6 
The effect of U.S. cross-listing and institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns with 
additional control variables. 
This table presents the ordinary least squares regression results on the effects of U.S. cross-listing and 
institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns. The dependent variable is Industrial 
adjusted returnsi,t, which is the industrial semi-annual adjusted equity returns calculated by 
subtracting the USD raw returns by the returns of an equally weight industrial portfolio according to 
the Fama-French 48 industry sectors. Table A shows the definition of the independent variables. All 
the regressions include the Fama-French 48 industrial dummies, country dummies and semi-annual 
time dummies. t-statistics according to firm cluster robust standard error are in the parenthesis. 
Significance level notations are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
  Law origin  
 (Whole sample) (Common-law) (Non-common-law) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Industrial adjusted 
returns
 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t 0.161* 0.193** -0.102 
 (1.93) (2.25) (-0.38) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 -0.00218 0.00443 -0.00482 
 (-0.23) (0.39) (-0.30) 
ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 -0.000504** 0.000480 0.0000964 
 (-2.19) (1.53) (0.29) 
No. of IOsi,t-2 0.000940*** 0.00133*** 0.000120 
 (8.65) (8.25) (0.88) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*Δ 
No. of IOsi,t-1 
0.00248*** 0.00258*** 0.00207** 
(4.40) (3.84) (2.47) 
Raw returnsi,t-1 0.0209*** 0.0284*** -0.0000852 
 (4.61) (4.42) (-0.01) 
Raw returnsi,t-2 0.00939** 0.0385*** -0.0184*** 
 (2.10) (5.75) (-3.42) 
Log pricei,t-1 -0.0170*** -0.0353*** -0.00797*** 
 (-15.30) (-13.01) (-7.16) 
S&P
 i,t-1 0.0172*** 0.00771 0.0171*** 
 (3.59) (0.96) (3.11) 
Age
 i,t-1 0.00000830 0.0000270 -0.0000387 
 (0.35) (0.81) (-1.24) 
VR
 i,t-1 0.0664 -0.165*** 0.273*** 
 (1.36) (-2.80) (3.26) 
BTV
 i,t-1 0.0464*** 0.0543*** 0.0326*** 
 (12.12) (8.25) (7.85) 
Log MKC
 i,t-1 -0.0137*** 0.00142 -0.0273*** 
 (-3.84) (0.24) (-6.38) 
Turnover
 i,t-1 -0.0311 -0.0121 -0.0450* 
 (-1.33) (-0.26) (-1.82) 
DVY
 i,t-1 0.288*** 0.0577 0.470*** 
 (4.32) (0.48) (6.25) 
Sales growth
 i,t-1  0.0123*** 0.0146*** 0.0129** 
 (3.17) (3.08) (2.24) 
Leverage
 i,t-1 -0.00172 0.0262* -0.00818 
 (-0.18) (1.83) (-0.73) 
Proportion of foreign 
sales
 i,t-1 
0.0104** -0.00939 0.0244*** 
(2.16) (-1.16) (4.50) 
Log Total Assetsi,t-1 0.00680** -0.00487 0.0265*** 
(2.01) (-0.89) (6.44) 
ROA
 i,t-1 0.00182*** 0.00127*** 0.00355*** 
 (13.82) (7.64) (15.56) 
Adjusted R2 0.0381 0.0484 0.0871 
N 86518 35538 50980 
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Table 7 
The effect of U.S. cross-listing and institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns with 
additional control variables, sub-sample analyses: Firm age and dividend yield. 
This table presents the ordinary least squares regression results on the effects of U.S. cross-listing and 
institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns with split samples. Columns 1 and 2 report 
the results of sub-sample with sample period mean age lower and higher than the sample period 
median respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of sub-sample with sample period mean 
dividend yield lower and higher than the sample period median respectively. The dependent variable 
is Industrial adjusted returnsi,t, which is the industrial semi-annual adjusted equity returns calculated 
by subtracting the USD raw returns by the returns of equally weight industrial portfolio according to 
Fama-French 48 industry sectors. Table A shows the definition of the independent variables. All the 
regressions include the Fama-French 48 industrial dummies, country dummies and semi-annual time 
dummies. t-statistics according to firm cluster robust standard error are in the parenthesis. 
Significance level notations are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 Firm age Dividend yield 
 (Low) (High) (Low) (High) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Industrial adjusted 
returns
 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t 0.213** -0.0989 0.190* 0.0439 
 (2.44) (-0.56) (1.87) (0.35) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 0.0189 -0.00980 0.00757 -0.0169* 
 (1.27) (-0.80) (0.47) (-1.92) 
ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 0.000191 -0.00106*** 0.000149 -0.00125*** 
 (0.25) (-4.94) (0.29) (-5.72) 
No. of IOsi,t-2 0.00190*** 0.000452*** 0.00178*** 0.000252** 
 (6.35) (4.17) (7.72) (2.30) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*ΔNo. 
of IOsi,t-1 
0.00359*** 0.00195*** 0.00381*** 0.00195*** 
(3.11) (3.27) (3.21) (3.61) 
Raw returnsi,t-1 0.0218*** 0.0271*** 0.0263*** 0.0292*** 
 (2.94) (5.14) (4.41) (4.75) 
Raw returnsi,t-2 0.0371*** -0.0123** 0.0295*** -0.0295*** 
 (4.90) (-2.41) (4.90) (-5.25) 
Log pricei,t-1 -0.0299*** -0.0122*** -0.0194*** -0.0142*** 
 (-10.31) (-10.36) (-12.16) (-9.96) 
S&P
 i,t-1 0.0385*** 0.0153*** 0.0340*** -0.00203 
 (3.15) (3.12) (3.33) (-0.40) 
Age
 i,t-1 -0.000128*** -0.000504*** 0.0000343 0.0000177 
 (-2.66) (-5.14) (1.20) (0.30) 
VR
 i,t-1 -0.119* 0.144* -0.0246 0.204** 
 (-1.88) (1.89) (-0.45) (2.01) 
BTV
 i,t-1 0.0541*** 0.0398*** 0.0501*** 0.0369*** 
 (6.82) (9.90) (8.55) (7.96) 
Log MKC
 i,t-1 -0.0128* -0.0263*** -0.0189*** -0.0341*** 
 (-1.84) (-6.18) (-3.61) (-6.80) 
Turnover
 i,t-1 -0.0567 -0.0191 -0.102*** 0.0440 
 (-1.03) (-0.80) (-2.98) (1.50) 
DVY
 i,t-1 -0.0540 0.284*** -0.112 0.319*** 
 (-0.24) (3.95) (-0.33) (4.41) 
Sales growth
 i,t-1  0.0106** 0.0212*** 0.0116** 0.0168*** 
 (2.02) (4.11) (2.43) (3.12) 
Leverage
 i,t-1 -0.0155 0.0114 -0.0229 0.00671 
 (-0.92) (1.09) (-1.64) (0.59) 
Proportion of foreign 
sales
 i,t-1 
-0.00808 0.0207*** 0.00922 0.0130** 
(-0.81) (4.09) (1.16) (2.49) 
Log Total Assetsi,t-1 -0.00450 0.0240*** 0.00165 0.0366*** 
(-0.70) (5.90) (0.33) (7.39) 
ROA
 i,t-1 0.00104*** 0.00372*** 0.00138*** 0.00475*** 
 (5.68) (16.21) (8.54) (16.44) 
Adjusted R2 0.0349 0.0650 0.0326 0.0777 
71 
 
N 24476 62042 40061 46457 
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Table 8 
The effect of U.S. cross-listing and institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns of 
firms from different legal origin regions with additional control variables, sub-sample analyses: Firm 
age and dividend yield. 
This table presents the ordinary least squares regression results on the effects of U.S. cross-listing and 
institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns with split samples. Columns 1 and 2 report 
the results of sub-sample with sample period mean age lower and higher than the sample period 
median respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of sub-sample with sample period mean 
dividend yield lower and higher than the sample period median respectively. The dependent variable 
is Industrial adjusted returnsi,t, which is the industrial semi-annual adjusted equity returns calculated 
by subtracting the USD raw returns by the returns of equally weight industrial portfolio according to 
Fama-French 48 industry sectors. Table A shows the definition of the independent variables. All the 
regressions include the Fama-French 48 industrial dummies, country dummies and semi-annual time 
dummies. t-statistics according to firm cluster robust standard error are in the parenthesis. 
Significance level notations are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 Firm age Dividend yield 
 (Low) (High) (Low) (High) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Industrial adjusted 
returns
 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
ΔU.S. Cross-listi,t 0.248*** -0.0861 0.220** 0.0731 
 (2.81) (-0.49) (2.13) (0.59) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 0.0401*** -0.00326 0.0253 -0.00837 
 (2.73) (-0.28) (1.63) (-0.99) 
ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 0.000608 -0.00117*** 0.000409 -0.00136*** 
 (0.84) (-5.98) (0.88) (-6.78) 
No. of IOsi,t-2 0.00211*** 0.000430*** 0.00184*** 0.000256*** 
 (7.49) (4.64) (8.89) (2.70) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*
ΔNo. of IOsi,t-1 
0.00322*** 0.00175*** 0.00360*** 0.00182*** 
(2.84) (3.09) (3.05) (3.54) 
Raw returnsi,t-1 0.0112* 0.0244*** 0.0165*** 0.0260*** 
 (1.83) (5.10) (3.27) (4.75) 
Raw returnsi,t-2 0.0256*** -0.0102** 0.0221*** -0.0283*** 
 (4.16) (-2.25) (4.38) (-5.71) 
Log pricei,t-1 -0.0352*** -0.00933*** -0.0213*** -0.00890*** 
 (-13.70) (-9.81) (-15.30) (-7.92) 
S&P
 i,t-1 0.0536*** 0.0171*** 0.0501*** -0.000846 
 (4.49) (3.73) (5.12) (-0.18) 
Age
 i,t-1 -0.000127*** -0.000337*** 0.0000464* 0.00000122 
 (-2.93) (-3.89) (1.85) (0.02) 
VR
 i,t-1 -0.0608 0.0734 0.000500 0.141* 
 (-1.29) (1.20) (0.01) (1.78) 
BTV
 i,t-1 0.0590*** 0.0403*** 0.0573*** 0.0384*** 
 (10.79) (14.31) (14.19) (11.48) 
Log MKC
 i,t-1 -0.0113** -0.0243*** -0.0153*** -0.0279*** 
 (-2.32) (-8.52) (-4.34) (-8.73) 
Turnover
 i,t-1 -0.0908* -0.0218 -0.122*** 0.0462* 
 (-1.90) (-1.02) (-4.01) (1.70) 
DVY
 i,t-1 0.256 0.281*** 0.165 0.324*** 
 (1.16) (4.60) (0.53) (5.14) 
Sales growth
 i,t-1  0.0132** 0.0210*** 0.0136*** 0.0178*** 
 (2.53) (4.16) (2.88) (3.38) 
Leverage
 i,t-1 
 
-0.00391 0.0211*** 0.00973 0.0166*** 
(-0.41) (4.60) (1.31) (3.48) 
Proportion of 
foreign sales
 i,t-1 
-0.00213 0.0209*** -0.00241 0.0283*** 
(-0.48) (7.89) (-0.73) (9.38) 
Log Total Assetsi,t-1 0.00110*** 0.00307*** 0.00134*** 0.00366*** 
 (7.29) (18.16) (10.10) (18.93) 
Adjusted R2 0.0376 0.0637 0.0355 0.0742 
N 34787 77662 54507 57942 
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Table 9 
The effect of U.S. cross-listing and institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns with 
additional control variables of London Stock Exchange cross-listing.  
This table presents the ordinary least squares regression results on the effects of U.S. cross-listing and 
institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns. The dependent variable is industrial 
adjusted returnsi,t, which is the semi-annual industrial adjusted equity returns calculated by 
subtracting the USD raw returns by the returns of the equally weight industrial portfolio according to 
Fama-French 48 industry sectors. Table A shows the definition of the independent variables. All the 
regressions include the Fama-French 48 industrial dummies, country dummies and semi-annual time 
dummies. t-statistics according to firm cluster robust standard error are in the parenthesis. 
Significance level notations are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
  Law origin  
 (Whole sample) (Common-law) (Non-common-law) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Industrial adjusted 
returns
 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
∆U.S. Cross-listi,t 0.182** 0.226*** -0.0894 
 (2.11) (2.58) (-0.33) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 0.00809 0.0239** -0.00570 
 (0.92) (2.22) (-0.36) 
∆LSE Cross-listi,t 0.112 0.125 0.0936 
 (1.23) (1.19) (0.62) 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1 0.0287 0.0344 0.0289 
 (1.62) (1.26) (1.29) 
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 -0.000274 0.000272 0.000262 
 (-1.32) (0.96) (0.91) 
No. of IOsi,t-2 0.00107*** 0.00124*** 0.000409*** 
 (11.13) (9.13) (3.34) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*∆ 
No. of IOsi,t-1 
0.00226*** 0.00236*** 0.00257** 
(4.00) (3.64) (2.37) 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1*∆ 
No. of IOsi,t-1 
0.000407 0.00125 -0.00148 
(0.21) (0.65) (-0.41) 
Raw returnsi,t-1 0.0126*** 0.0122** 0.0165*** 
 (3.25) (2.34) (3.12) 
Raw returnsi,t-2 0.0128*** 0.0311*** 0.000173 
 (3.43) (5.95) (0.04) 
Log pricei,t-1 -0.0156*** -0.0383*** -0.00487*** 
 (-17.17) (-17.43) (-5.51) 
S&P
 i,t-1 0.0253*** 0.0228*** 0.0205*** 
 (5.50) (2.92) (4.03) 
Age
 i,t-1 0.0000880*** 0.0000674** 0.000165*** 
 (4.56) (2.46) (6.52) 
VR
 i,t-1 0.0109 -0.120*** 0.0393 
 (0.31) (-2.81) (0.65) 
BTV
 i,t-1 0.0535*** 0.0557*** 0.0481*** 
 (23.90) (15.73) (19.05) 
Log MKC
 i,t-1 -0.00639*** 0.00167 -0.000871 
 (-6.15) (0.81) (-0.78) 
Turnover
 i,t-1 -0.0627*** -0.0589 -0.0788*** 
 (-2.94) (-1.47) (-3.43) 
DVY
 i,t-1 0.416*** 0.152 0.632*** 
 (7.10) (1.42) (9.71) 
Adjusted R2 0.0330 0.0415 0.0723 
N 116563 53779 62784 
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Table 10 
The effect of U.S. cross-listing and institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns with 
additional control variables of London Stock Exchange cross-listing, sub-sample analyses: Firm age 
and dividend yield 
This table presents the ordinary least squares regression results on the effects of U.S. cross-listing and 
institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns with split samples. Columns 1 and 2 report 
the results of sub-sample with sample period mean age lower and higher than the sample period 
median respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of sub-sample with sample period mean 
dividend yield lower and higher than the sample period median respectively. The dependent variable 
is Industrial adjusted returnsi,t, which is the industrial adjusted semi-annual equity returns calculated 
by subtracting the USD raw returns by the returns of equally weight industrial portfolio according to 
Fama-French 48 industry sectors. Table A shows the definition of the independent variables. All the 
regressions include the Fama-French 48 industrial dummies, country dummies and semi-annual time 
dummies. t-statistics according to firm cluster robust standard error are in the parenthesis. 
Significance level notations are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 Firm age Dividend yield 
 (Low) (High) (Low) (High) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Industrial adjusted 
returns
 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
∆U.S. Cross-listi,t 0.259*** -0.0999 0.232** 0.0927 
 (2.89) (-0.57) (2.20) (0.78) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 0.0474*** -0.00296 0.0332** -0.00803 
 (3.32) (-0.28) (2.20) (-0.98) 
∆LSE Cross-listi,t 0.107 0.190** 0.113 0.141 
 (1.03) (2.38) (1.10) (1.48) 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1 0.0262 0.0402** 0.0222 0.0399*** 
 (0.87) (2.06) (0.76) (2.70) 
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 0.000575 -0.00109*** 0.000538 -0.00131*** 
 (0.83) (-5.53) (1.18) (-6.53) 
No. of IOsi,t-2 0.00210*** 0.000504*** 0.00192*** 0.000317*** 
 (7.57) (5.43) (9.27) (3.36) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*∆ 
No. of IOsi,t-1 
0.00342*** 0.00177*** 0.00370*** 0.00191*** 
(3.01) (3.08) (3.07) (3.71) 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1*∆ 
No. of IOsi,t-1 
-0.000650 0.000914 0.000819 0.0000880 
(-0.13) (0.69) (0.20) (0.06) 
Raw returnsi,t-1 0.00944 0.0341*** 0.0166*** 0.0340*** 
 (1.64) (7.15) (3.43) (6.22) 
Raw returnsi,t-2 0.0317*** -0.00220 0.0286*** -0.0183*** 
 (5.49) (-0.49) (5.94) (-3.72) 
Log pricei,t-1 -0.0377*** -0.00765*** -0.0225*** -0.00622*** 
 (-15.20) (-8.47) (-16.38) (-5.79) 
S&P
 i,t-1 0.0638*** 0.0123*** 0.0543*** -0.00275 
 (5.23) (2.72) (5.48) (-0.59) 
Age
 i,t-1 -0.000135*** -0.000338*** 0.0000771*** 0.0000197 
 (-3.14) (-3.86) (3.16) (0.36) 
VR
 i,t-1 -0.0842* -0.0621 -0.0306 0.0335 
 (-1.89) (-1.06) (-0.77) (0.43) 
BTV
 i,t-1 0.0616*** 0.0511*** 0.0598*** 0.0496*** 
 (14.52) (21.64) (18.10) (17.70) 
Log MKC
 i,t-1 -0.0103*** -0.000856 -0.0149*** 0.00129 
 (-3.92) (-0.82) (-8.61) (1.14) 
Turnover
 i,t-1 -0.117** -0.0443** -0.141*** 0.0382 
 (-2.55) (-2.01) (-4.65) (1.36) 
DVY
 i,t-1 0.409* 0.434*** 0.535* 0.444*** 
 (1.81) (7.07) (1.71) (7.00) 
Adjusted R2 0.0366 0.0520 0.0327 0.0601 
N 38350 78213 58277 58286 
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Table 11 
The effect of U.S. cross-listing and institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns with 
additional control variables of London Stock Exchange cross-listing and global cross-listing.  
This table presents the ordinary least squares regression results on the effects of U.S. cross-listing and 
institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns. The dependent variable is industrial 
adjusted returnsi,t, which is the semi-annual industrial adjusted equity returns calculated by 
subtracting the USD raw returns by the returns of the equally weight industrial portfolio according to 
Fama-French 48 industry sectors. Table A shows the definition of the independent variables. All the 
regressions include the Fama-French 48 industrial dummies, country dummies and semi-annual time 
dummies. t-statistics according to firm cluster robust standard error are in the parenthesis. 
Significance level notations are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
  Law origin  
 (Whole sample) (Common-law) (Non-common-law) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Industrial adjusted returns
 
Industrial adjusted returns Industrial adjusted returns 
∆ U.S. Cross-listi,t 0.182** 0.226*** -0.0867 
 (2.11) (2.58) (-0.33) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 0.00775 0.0235** -0.00414 
 (0.88) (2.18) (-0.27) 
∆LSE Cross-listi,t 0.115 0.125 0.0887 
 (1.25) (1.19) (0.60) 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1 0.0283 0.0330 0.0290 
 (1.60) (1.21) (1.29) 
∆Global Cross-listi,t 0.119*** 0.217*** -0.0360 
 (3.39) (4.19) (-1.01) 
Global Cross-listi,t-1 -0.000773 0.0108 -0.00963 
 (-0.08) (0.70) (-0.91) 
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 -0.000298 0.000244 0.000306 
 (-1.40) (0.85) (1.02) 
No. of IOsi,t-2 0.00107*** 0.00124*** 0.000420*** 
 (11.06) (9.07) (3.42) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*∆ No. of 
IOsi,t-1 
0.00225*** 0.00231*** 0.00263** 
(3.94) (3.49) (2.45) 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1*∆ No. of 
IOsi,t-1 
0.000334 0.00113 -0.00133 
(0.17) (0.59) (-0.36) 
Global Cross-listi,t-1*∆ No. of 
IOsi,t-1 
0.000235 0.000190 -0.000501 
(0.37) (0.21) (-0.56) 
Raw returnsi,t-1 0.0125*** 0.0120** 0.0166*** 
 (3.23) (2.30) (3.13) 
Raw returnsi,t-2 0.0128*** 0.0310*** 0.000194 
 (3.41) (5.94) (0.04) 
Log pricei,t-1 -0.0156*** -0.0383*** -0.00489*** 
 (-17.17) (-17.40) (-5.52) 
S&P
 i,t-1 0.0253*** 0.0231*** 0.0214*** 
 (5.49) (2.96) (4.16) 
Age
 i,t-1 0.0000883*** 0.0000692** 0.000164*** 
 (4.58) (2.52) (6.50) 
VR
 i,t-1 0.0108 -0.120*** 0.0396 
 (0.30) (-2.82) (0.66) 
BTV
 i,t-1 0.0535*** 0.0556*** 0.0481*** 
 (23.88) (15.70) (19.05) 
Log MKC
 i,t-1 -0.00639*** 0.00149 -0.000870 
 (-6.14) (0.72) (-0.78) 
Turnover
 i,t-1 -0.0622*** -0.0572 -0.0786*** 
 (-2.91) (-1.42) (-3.42) 
DVY
 i,t-1 0.416*** 0.150 0.631*** 
 (7.10) (1.40) (9.70) 
F-test of whether the coefficients of  ∆U.S. Cross-listi,t and ∆Global Cross-listi,t are equal 
P-value of the F-test 0.4994 0.9297 N/A 
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.0418 0.0723 
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Table 12 
The effect of U.S. cross-listing and institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns with 
additional control variables of London Stock Exchange cross-listing and global cross-listing, 
sub-sample analyses: Firm age and dividend yield. 
This table presents the ordinary least squares regression results on the effects of U.S. cross-listing and 
institutional ownership level on industrial adjusted returns with split samples. Columns 1 and 2 report 
the results of sub-sample with sample period mean age lower and higher than the sample period 
median respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of sub-sample with sample period mean 
dividend yield lower and higher than the sample period median respectively. The dependent variable 
is Industrial adjusted returnsi,t, which is the industrial adjusted semi-annual equity returns calculated 
by subtracting the USD raw returns by the returns of equally weight industrial portfolio according to 
Fama-French 48 industry sectors. Table A shows the definition of the independent variables. All the 
regressions include the Fama-French 48 industrial dummies, country dummies and semi-annual time 
dummies. t-statistics according to firm cluster robust standard error are in the parenthesis. 
Significance level notations are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 Firm age Dividend yield 
 (Low) (High) (Low) (High) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Industrial adjusted 
returns
 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
Industrial adjusted 
returns 
∆ U.S. Cross-listi,t 0.260*** -0.0990 0.232** 0.0923 
 (2.90) (-0.57) (2.21) (0.77) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 0.0481*** -0.00332 0.0330** -0.00780 
 (3.36) (-0.31) (2.19) (-0.95) 
∆LSE Cross-listi,t 0.112 0.190** 0.118 0.141 
 (1.07) (2.38) (1.14) (1.48) 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1 0.0252 0.0400** 0.0213 0.0401*** 
 (0.83) (2.05) (0.73) (2.73) 
∆Global Cross-listi,t 0.208*** 0.0761** 0.175*** 0.0684* 
 (2.64) (2.38) (3.13) (1.82) 
Global Cross-listi,t-1 0.0219 -0.00252 0.0107 -0.00584 
 (0.89) (-0.30) (0.61) (-0.68) 
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 0.000472 -0.00112*** 0.000375 -0.00131*** 
 (0.67) (-5.54) (0.80) (-6.38) 
No. of IOsi,t-2 0.00209*** 0.000503*** 0.00191*** 0.000319*** 
 (7.51) (5.41) (9.18) (3.37) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1*∆ No. of IOsi,t-1 0.00353*** 0.00169*** 0.00379*** 0.00191*** 
(3.07) (2.91) (3.14) (3.74) 
LSE Cross-listi,t-1*∆ No. of IOsi,t-1 -0.000855 0.000868 0.000581 0.000130 
(-0.17) (0.66) (0.14) (0.09) 
Global Cross-listi,t-1*∆ No. of 
IOsi,t-1 
0.00192 0.000369 0.00279* -0.0000411 
(0.48) (0.63) (1.66) (-0.07) 
Raw returnsi,t-1 0.00936 0.0340*** 0.0164*** 0.0341*** 
 (1.62) (7.13) (3.39) (6.22) 
Raw returnsi,t-2 0.0318*** -0.00228 0.0285*** -0.0183*** 
 (5.50) (-0.51) (5.94) (-3.73) 
Log pricei,t-1 -0.0377*** -0.00766*** -0.0225*** -0.00625*** 
 (-15.19) (-8.48) (-16.38) (-5.82) 
S&P
 i,t-1 0.0650*** 0.0124*** 0.0550*** -0.00253 
 (5.30) (2.72) (5.57) (-0.54) 
Age
 i,t-1 -0.000134*** -0.000338*** 0.0000772*** 0.0000184 
 (-3.10) (-3.86) (3.17) (0.34) 
VR
 i,t-1 -0.0851* -0.0620 -0.0309 0.0337 
 (-1.91) (-1.06) (-0.78) (0.43) 
BTV
 i,t-1 0.0616*** 0.0511*** 0.0597*** 0.0497*** 
 (14.50) (21.61) (18.09) (17.68) 
Log MKC
 i,t-1 -0.0106*** -0.000838 -0.0150*** 0.00133 
 (-4.01) (-0.80) (-8.66) (1.17) 
Turnover
 i,t-1 -0.116** -0.0441** -0.140*** 0.0385 
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 (-2.52) (-2.00) (-4.61) (1.37) 
DVY
 i,t-1 0.407* 0.434*** 0.531* 0.444*** 
 (1.81) (7.07) (1.70) (7.00) 
F-test with null hypothesis: coef.. of ∆U.S. Cross-listi,t and ∆Global Cross-listi,t are equal 
P-value of the F-test 0.6631 N/A 0.6286 N/A 
F-test with null hypothesis: coef.. of ∆LSE Cross-listi,t and ∆Global Cross-listi,t are equal 
P-value of the F-test N/A 0.1862 N/A N/A 
Adjusted R2 0.0368 0.0520 0.0329 0.0602 
N 38350 78213 58277 58286 
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Table 13 
The effect of the U.S. cross-listing and institutional ownership level on raw returns, non-crisis period 
and crisis period. 
This table presents the ordinary least squares regression results on the effects of U.S. cross-listing and 
institutional ownership level on raw returns. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the results of the whole 
sample, the common-law sample and non-common-law sample during the non-crisis period, 
respectively. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the results of the whole sample, the common-law sample and 
non-common-law sample during the crisis period, respectively. The dependent variable is Raw 
returnsi,t, which is the USD semi-annual raw equity returns. Table A shows the definition of the 
independent variables. All the regressions include the Fama-French 48 industrial dummies, country 
dummies and semi-annual time dummies. t-statistics according to firm cluster robust standard error 
are in the parenthesis. Significance level notations are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
  Non-crisis 
period 
  Crisis period  
  Law origin   Law origin  
 (Whole 
sample) 
(Common-law) (Non-common
- 
law) 
(Whole 
sample) 
(Common-law) (Non-common
- 
law) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Raw returns
 
Raw returns Raw returns Raw returns Raw returns Raw returns 
∆U.S. Cross-listi,t 0.163 0.210** -0.424*** 0.285 0.325 0.355*** 
 (1.52) (1.99) (-21.59) (1.09) (1.10) (10.62) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 0.0154* 0.0328*** 0.00572 0.0250 0.0288 -0.00416 
 (1.72) (2.99) (0.36) (1.28) (1.15) (-0.15) 
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 -0.000278 0.000337 0.000268 0.00113* 0.00464*** -0.000918 
 (-1.28) (1.18) (0.83) (1.84) (5.26) (-1.14) 
No. of IOsi,t-2 0.000933*** 0.00163*** -0.000571*** 0.00189*** 0.00144*** 0.00154*** 
 (7.84) (9.58) (-3.91) (10.25) (5.52) (6.43) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1* 
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 
0.00221*** 0.00235*** 0.00161* -0.00233 -0.00106 0.00393 
(4.27) (3.94) (1.79) (-1.15) (-0.46) (1.16) 
Raw returnsi,t-1 -0.00000808 0.00794 0.0479*** -0.0573*** -0.0543*** -0.109*** 
 (-0.00) (1.29) (7.72) (-7.35) (-5.08) (-10.65) 
Raw returnsi,t-2 0.0402*** 0.0421*** 0.0308*** -0.111*** 0.000212 -0.150*** 
 (9.22) (7.17) (5.52) (-10.79) (0.02) (-11.24) 
Log pricei,t-1 -0.0134*** -0.0327*** -0.00471*** -0.0255*** -0.0637*** -0.00815*** 
 (-12.95) (-13.14) (-4.52) (-14.06) (-15.04) (-4.25) 
S&P
 i,t-1 0.0374*** 0.0370*** 0.0283*** 0.0201** 0.00969 0.00932 
 (7.35) (4.33) (5.06) (2.18) (0.62) (0.89) 
Age
 i,t-1 0.000143*** 0.0000948*** 0.000207*** 0.0000489 0.0000718 0.000138*** 
 (6.39) (3.00) (7.01) (1.33) (1.41) (2.73) 
VR
 i,t-1 -0.110*** -0.158*** -0.220*** 0.528*** 0.153* 0.783*** 
 (-2.73) (-3.25) (-3.36) (6.80) (1.80) (4.53) 
BTV
 i,t-1 0.0449*** 0.0533*** 0.0378*** 0.0760*** 0.0726*** 0.0604*** 
 (16.94) (11.57) (13.42) (20.93) (14.03) (13.85) 
Log MKC
 i,t-1 -0.00853*** -0.00492** -0.000425 -0.00515** 0.0187*** -0.00166 
 (-7.09) (-2.09) (-0.33) (-2.42) (4.52) (-0.70) 
Turnover
 i,t-1 -0.192*** -0.227*** -0.132*** 0.0535 0.137* -0.0481 
 (-8.26) (-5.00) (-5.41) (1.10) (1.66) (-0.87) 
DVY
 i,t-1 0.248*** 0.0599 0.831*** 0.512*** -0.167 0.310*** 
 (3.69) (0.51) (10.47) (5.11) (-0.92) (2.90) 
Adjusted R2 0.141 0.183 0.124 0.416 0.500 0.343 
N 82821 38083 44738 33742 15696 18046 
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Table 14 
The effect of U.S. cross-listing and institutional ownership level on raw returns during non-crisis 
period, sub-sample analyses: Firm age and dividend yield. 
This table presents the ordinary least squares regression results on the effects of U.S. cross-listing and 
institutional ownership level on raw returns with split samples. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of 
sub-sample with sample period mean age lower and higher than the sample period median 
respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of sub-sample with sample period mean dividend 
yield lower and higher than the sample period median respectively. The dependent variable is Raw 
returnsi,t, which is the USD semi-annual raw equity returns. Table A shows the definition of the 
independent variables. All the regressions include the Fama-French 48 industrial dummies, country 
dummies and semi-annual time dummies. t-statistics according to firm cluster robust standard error 
are in the parenthesis. Significance level notations are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 Firm age Dividend yield 
 (Low) (High) (Low) (High) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Raw returns
 
Raw returns Raw returns Raw returns 
∆U.S. Cross-listi,t 0.239** -0.465*** 0.199 0.0802 
 (2.28) (-26.37) (1.57) (0.50) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 0.0609*** 0.00180 0.0410*** -0.000334 
 (4.23) (0.17) (2.65) (-0.04) 
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 0.000112 -0.00107*** 0.000655 -0.00145*** 
 (0.14) (-5.55) (1.28) (-7.55) 
No. of IOsi,t-2 0.00256*** 0.000144 0.00211*** -0.0000147 
 (7.50) (1.27) (7.99) (-0.13) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1* 
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 
0.00393*** 0.00192*** 0.00327*** 0.00202*** 
(3.49) (3.59) (2.78) (4.57) 
Raw returnsi,t-1 0.00338 0.0524*** 0.00272 0.0507*** 
 (0.50) (8.95) (0.47) (7.67) 
Raw returnsi,t-2 0.0438*** 0.0359*** 0.0484*** 0.0332*** 
 (6.74) (7.03) (8.77) (6.01) 
Log pricei,t-1 -0.0337*** -0.00642*** -0.0202*** -0.00493*** 
 (-12.19) (-6.12) (-12.72) (-4.04) 
S&P
 i,t-1 0.0682*** 0.0255*** 0.0665*** 0.00657 
 (5.16) (5.25) (6.13) (1.32) 
Age
 i,t-1 -0.0000880* -0.000360*** 0.000138*** 0.0000558 
 (-1.80) (-3.89) (4.76) (1.00) 
VR
 i,t-1 -0.125** -0.393*** -0.104** -0.483*** 
 (-2.51) (-6.03) (-2.31) (-5.91) 
BTV
 i,t-1 0.0650*** 0.0399*** 0.0574*** 0.0377*** 
 (11.59) (15.30) (13.57) (13.70) 
Log MKC
 i,t-1 -0.0169*** -0.00290** -0.0187*** -0.000318 
 (-5.63) (-2.40) (-9.22) (-0.25) 
Turnover
 i,t-1 -0.263*** -0.136*** -0.271*** -0.0640** 
 (-5.04) (-5.76) (-8.06) (-2.23) 
DVY
 i,t-1 0.873*** 0.372*** -1.178*** 0.399*** 
 (3.40) (5.34) (-2.92) (5.66) 
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.148 0.148 0.174 
N 26818 56003 41063 41758 
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Table 15 
The effect of U.S. cross-listing and institutional ownership level on raw returns during crisis period, 
sub-sample analyses: Firm age and dividend yield. 
This table presents the ordinary least squares regression results on the effects of U.S. cross-listing and 
institutional ownership level on raw returns with split samples. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of 
sub-sample with sample period mean age lower and higher than the sample period median respectively. 
Columns 3 and 4 report the results of sub-sample with sample period mean dividend yield lower and 
higher than the sample period median respectively. The dependent variable is Raw returnsi,t, which is 
the USD semi-annual raw equity returns. Table A shows the definition of the independent variables. All 
the regressions include the Fama-French 48 industrial dummies, country dummies and semi-annual 
time dummies. t-statistics according to firm cluster robust standard error are in the parenthesis. 
Significance level notations are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 Firm age Dividend yield 
 (Low) (High) (Low) (High) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Raw returns
 
Raw returns Raw returns Raw returns 
∆U.S. Cross-listi,t 0.399 0.156 0.406 0.205*** 
 (1.12) (1.40) (1.09) (5.60) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1 0.0417 0.00929 0.0705** -0.00857 
 (1.23) (0.47) (2.05) (-0.59) 
∆No. of IOsi,t-1 0.00518*** -0.00170*** 0.00235** -0.000980 
 (3.36) (-2.75) (2.12) (-1.48) 
No. of IOsi,t-2 0.00285*** 0.000823*** 0.00292*** 0.000566*** 
 (5.98) (4.53) (7.92) (3.02) 
U.S. Cross-listi,t-1* ∆No. of 
IOsi,t-1 
-0.00516 0.00121 -0.00290 -0.00120 
(-1.16) (0.81) (-0.64) (-0.70) 
Raw returnsi,t-1 -0.0478*** -0.0629*** -0.0408*** -0.0694*** 
 (-3.99) (-6.68) (-4.10) (-6.18) 
Raw returnsi,t-2 -0.0121 -0.169*** -0.0590*** -0.213*** 
 (-0.81) (-14.02) (-4.60) (-16.28) 
Log pricei,t-1 -0.0584*** -0.0129*** -0.0347*** -0.0112*** 
 (-12.15) (-7.08) (-12.87) (-5.34) 
S&P
 i,t-1 0.0692*** -0.00142 0.0473** -0.00636 
 (3.00) (-0.16) (2.42) (-0.69) 
Age
 i,t-1 -0.000266*** 0.0389*** 0.00000774 -0.000100 
 (-3.17) (75.16) (0.17) (-0.88) 
VR
 i,t-1 0.146 0.712*** 0.356*** 1.286*** 
 (1.58) (5.22) (4.22) (6.26) 
BTV
 i,t-1 0.0807*** 0.0609*** 0.0833*** 0.0572*** 
 (13.17) (15.24) (16.49) (11.91) 
Log MKC
 i,t-1 0.00376 0.00343 -0.0136*** 0.00551** 
 (0.73) (1.61) (-4.05) (2.35) 
Turnover
 i,t-1 0.0727 0.0383 0.00631 0.0959 
 (0.76) (0.75) (0.10) (1.37) 
DVY
 i,t-1 -0.439 0.409*** 2.450*** 0.400*** 
 (-1.34) (3.80) (4.50) (3.60) 
Adjusted R2 0.479 0.404 0.436 0.439 
N 11532 22210 17214 16528 
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